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VISIONS OF A LABOR LAWYER: THE LEGACY OF
JUSTICE BRENNAN
B. GLENN GEORGE*
William J. Brennan, Jr., former labor lawyer and son of a labor
leader, has molded the landscape of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA)' more than any other Justice on the United States
Supreme Court. Beginning with his first labor decision 2 which he
rendered just weeks after his appointment to the Court, Justice
Brennan worked over three decades to guide the development of
labor relations in a direction that was consistent with his own
vision of, and perhaps experience with, the parameters of the
employee-union-management relationship drawn by the NLRA. A
study of his opinions reveals something of that vision and his
indelible mark on labor law.3
Although Justice Brennan's opinions cover a broad spectrum
of labor issues, they are stitched together with a common thread.
The overriding theme that seems to guide much of his labor
jurisprudence is the achievement of industrial peace through the
voluntary settlement of disputes by the somewhat anomalous
method of protecting the parties' access to economic weapons
and restricting the courts' interference with the union-manage-
ment relationship. The NLRA mandates that relationship, of
course, when an appropriate unit of employees has chosen union
* @ 1990 B. Glenn George, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978.
I am indebted to Charles Craver, Barbara Fick, Toni Massaro, and Calvin Sharpe for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. 29 U.S.C. 5§ 151-169 (1988).
2. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
3. Even a casual student of labor law will recognize many of the landmark decisions
Justice Brennan authored-decisions such as NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465
U.S. 822 (1984) (protecting as "concerted activity" a single employee's invocation of rights
under a collective bargaining agreement); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251
(1975) (protecting an employee's right to union representation during a disciplinary
investigation interview); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970) (permitting federal courts to enjoin a strike in violation of a collective-bargaining
agreement containing a mandatory arbitration provision, in spite of the apparent prohi-
bition against such injunctions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act); National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) (protecting work preservation clauses as primary
activity); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),
377 U.S. 58 (1964) (protecting a union's right to engage in peaceful product boycott
picketing); and NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (prohibiting an employer from making
unilateral changes in employment terms during collective bargaining).
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representation through Board-regulated procedures. 4 Once the
relationship is established, however, Brennan insists that the
terms of the "marriage" should depend largely on the economic
strength of the parties with minimal intrusion by the Board,
even less interference from the federal courts, and virtually no
involvement by the state courts.5
Justice Brennan by no means worked from a blank slate when
he crafted his approach to the NLRA. The stage already was set
by the structure of the Act itself and early Court decisions
interpreting the legislation.6 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan guided
the development of the statute at several crossroads at which
the Court might have made other choices.
Part I of this Article offers a brief biography of Justice Brennan
and his labor law "roots." Part II begins with a summary of the
Brennan philosophy suggested by the Article's review of his
labor law opinions. The heart of the Article is found in Parts
II(A) and (B), which attempt to organize a significant majority of
Brennan's labor decisions into various topics and to trace the
themes of economic freedom and judicial restraint through those
opinions.7 Part III concludes with an effort to synthesize the
labor law jurisprudence of Justice Brennan as reflecting both a
judge and a life.
4. 29 U.S.C. S 157.
5. See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, § 1, Findings and Declaration of Policy, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (expressing policy to protect free flow of commerce by encouraging collective
bargaining); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (upholding the
constitutionality of the NLRA); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 33941
(1938) (authorizing an employer to hire permanent replacements during an economic
strike); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941) (examining NLRB's remedial
authority); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 344-47 (1944) (finding that union becomes
exclusive representative of unit employees after certification, overriding individual em-
ployment contracts); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404-09 (1952) (holding
NLRB may not determine reasonableness of substantive contract terms in enforcing duty
to bargain); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 335-38 (1953) (exploring union's
duty of fair representation in collective bargaining).
7. My focus is limited to opinions (whether majority, concurring, or dissenting) that
Justice Brennan actually wrote. I make no attempt to analyze his votes in other cases.
As suggested at the outset, the thesis is further limited primarily to Brennan's philosophy
of labor relations under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 151-169, although the analysis discusses
some of Brennan's opinions concerning the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §S 151-188 (1988),
see infra notes 76-87, 258-64, 302-07 and accompanying text, constitutional claims of public
employees, see infra note 395, and affirmative action doctrine, see infra note 100. My
research methodology involved review of all Brennan opinions contained in Westlaw's
Federal Labor Law/Supreme Court database.
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I. ROOTS
Justice Brennan's labor law background began with his father,
William Joseph Brennan, Sr., an Irishman who immigrated to the
United States in 1880.8 Brennan, Sr. first found employment in
the United States working on the canal in Trenton, New Jersey.
He soon switched to a job shoveling coal at Ballantine's brewery
in Newark. According to one biographer, the elder Brennan joined
the Stationary Fireman's Union but apparently became dissatis-
fied with the union's operations.9 He began campaigning for
reform and later was selected as the union business agent. By
1916 when the future Justice was ten, his father had become the
business agent of the International Brotherhood of Engineers and
Oilers. 10 Justice Brennan recently described his father's union
involvement a little differently:
Actually what happened is that when he started shoveling coal
at Ballantine's, he thought the conditions were bad for ordinary
workers. He started organizing within Ballantine's and then
spread around to the other breweries around the city. Remem-
ber, there were no trade laws to help you in those days. You
just had to fight your way through. He did it so well that he
moved up within the organized labor hierarchy around Newark.
At the same time he was going up locally, he was also going
up internationally in the International Brotherhood of Firemen
and Oilers."
Regardless of the details, the union involvement of the father
clearly had a significant impact on the son. Justice Brennan once
stated, "Everything I am, I am because of my father."'12
William Brennan, Sr.'s labor involvement soon expanded be-
yond his role at Ballantine's. Following a defeated trolley strike
in Newark, he was active in a movement to reform city govern-
ment and later became the labor candidate on the city commission
in the new regime. As described by his son:
Well, [the trolley strike] led to a movement, in which my
father was very active, to change the form of government in
8. See JOHN P. FRANK, THE WARREN COURT 115 (1964).
9. Id
10. See id.
11. Sean O'Murchu, Lone Justice: An Interview with Justice William Brennan, Jr., IRISH
Am. MAG., June, 1990, at 27, 28.
12. Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. TniErs, Oct. 5, 1986, § 6 (magazine), at
25, 26.
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Newark. And before it was changed-in an effort to prevent
the change-my father was appointed a police commissioner
by the mayor, and he promptly showed where he stood in the
labor disputes and then that led to one fight after another.
And, by God, they changed it. They changed the form of
government from what was a mayor-alderman form to a mayor-
councilman form, with commissions, and labor got representa-
tion.13
Justice Brennan had his own encounters with blue collar life
as a boy. His jobs included delivering milk, providing change on
trolley cars, working as a filling station attendant, and delivering
groceries.14
Justice Brennan's legal career began in Newark in 1931 after
he graduated from Harvard Law School, 15 where he served as
president of the student legal aid society.' 6 He practiced labor
law, but on the employer's side. Indeed, his clients included such
well-known corporations as Western Electric, Jersey Bell Tele-
phone, Phelps Dodge, and Celanese Corporation.17 During World
War II, Brennan continued working on labor issues for the
government, including an assignment as the Chief of the Labor
Branch, Army Service Forces. 8 His accomplishments included
the settlement of serious labor disputes in the aircraft industry
for the Army Air Forces.1 9
Justice Brennan's judicial career began in 1949 with his ap-
pointment as a state trial judge in New Jersey.20 He quickly was
elevated to the appellate section and then, in 1952, to the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey.2' Brennan joined the Supreme Court
of the United States as a recess appointment by President
Eisenhower on October 15, 1956.22 The Senate confirmed his
nomination to the Court on March 19, 1957.P
13. O'Murchu, supra note 11, at 28.
14. FRANK, supra note 8, at 115.
15. Id. at 116.
16. Leeds, supra note 12, at 47.
17. FRANK, supra note 8, at 117.
18. Id. at 118.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 119.
21. See id.
22. 352 U.S. at iv.
23. Id. Appropriately enough, Senator Joseph McCarthy cast the only negative vote
against Justice Brennan's confirmation. Nat Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 45, 54.
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II. VISIONS OF A LABOR LAWYER
Justice Brennan was a young practicing labor lawyer when
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935.24 No
doubt he followed with interest the negotiations and debates that
led to the Act's passage. One reasonably can assume from the
outset his familiarity with the Act's "Findings and Policies. '25
The first section of the statute suggests that the free flow of
commerce can be enhanced in three ways: (1) by reducing "in-
dustrial strife," (2) by promoting "friendly adjustment of indus-
trial disputes," and (3) "by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees. 26
Congress' explicit concern with bargaining power inequality
might have implied a need to closely monitor and limit economic
weapons to balance the parties' bargaining strength. Indeed, the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board), as primary inter-
preter of the Act, attempted as much. 27 Yet Justice Brennan,
early in his career, charted quite a different course. He believed
that the use of economic weapons, by both employers and unions,
must be left to forces of the industrial market, unregulated by
the Board or the courts. As he explained:
It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system
where the Government does not attempt to control the results
of negotiations, cannot be equated with an academic collective
search for truth-or even with what might be thought to be
the ideal of one. The parties-even granting the modification
of views that may come from a realization of economic inter-
dependence- still proceed from contrary and to an extent
antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The sys-
tem has not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that
perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect
agreement among them on values. The presence of economic
weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by
the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.28
24. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. SS 151-
169 (1988)).
25. 29 U.S.C. 5 151.
26. Id.
27. For example, see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1960)
(discussing the impact of economic weapons on the bargaining process), discussed infra
notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
28. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 488-89.
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Justice Brennan thought interference with economic weapons
would undermine a fundamental premise of the NLRA's scheme:
the parties are compelled to bargain under the Act, but are not
required to reach agreement.2 The statute makes no attempt to
regulate the substantive terms of employment. Yet the regulation
of economic weapons, he reasoned, could improperly influence
those substantive terms in contradiction of one of the Act's basic
tenets. The best path to the industrial peace sought by the
NLRA was through the free play of economic forces. Overruling
the Board repeatedly, Justice Brennan strove to maximize the
parties' access to their own economic power as a critical compo-
nent of collective bargaining.30
The NLRA scheme, as more fully developed by Justice
Brennan's vision, created something of a "cold war" mentality.
Peace-in this case, industrial peace-was to be achieved by the
adversaries of union and management building up their respective
arsenals to the extent external economic forces permitted. Em-
ployers with a strong financial base, stockpiled inventory, and
perhaps the aid of high unemployment to facilitate the hiring of
replacements, could more readily insist on favorable contract
terms, knowing that they could withstand a threatened strike.
By the same token, a strong union with the support of a skilled
and irreplaceable workforce could be more successful in securing
its negotiating demands.31
The free play of economic weapons had its limits, however,
even in Brennan's view. Justice Brennan agreed that some tactics
could be so inherently destructive of the bargaining relationship
that prohibition was required, particularly when an employer's
action served to undermine the solidarity of the employees as a
group.32 After all, Brennan described the interplay of economic
forces as a means to an end-achieving industrial peace-not the
end in itself.33
29. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937):
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It
does not compel any agreement whatever .... The theory of the Act is
that free opportunity for negotiation . . . is likely to promote industrial
peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act
in itself does not attempt to compel.
30. See infra notes 41-87 and accompanying text.
31. See generally ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 29-35 (3d ed. 1989)
(discussing the strike as the primary source of union power).
32. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
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Others have suggested that the protection of individual rights
is the key to Justice Brennan's labor law jurisprudence. 34 Cer-
tainly protection of such rights was a consistent theme in many
of Brennan's constitutional decisions. 35 Likewise, one may char-
acterize many of his significant labor opinions as protecting the
single employee or union member. This focus of Justice Brennan's
work, however, need not be viewed as independent from the
deregulation of economic weapons.
Protecting the parties' use of economic weapons serves, in
Brennan's thinking, to protect the process of collective bargaining
without requiring agreement to any particular substantive terms.
Justice Brennan's individual rights cases serve much the same
function by preventing undue interference by the union or the
employer. In those cases in which the individual found herself at
odds with union leadership, Justice Brennan's decisions sought
to ensure principles of democracy by prohibiting unreasonable
restrictions on candidates for union office and by limiting the
union's ability to expend union dues on matters other than
collective bargaining.36 The power of the group-employee soli-
darity-was enhanced by restricting policies that detracted from
the group voice. When the individual found herself confronting
the employer, Brennan's decisions reflected a similar concern by
stretching the Act's protection to ensure that a single employee
could reaffirm group solidarity by relying on the assistance of
her collective representative.Y
Before embarking on the proposed task, a caveat is necessary.
I do not intend my suggestions about central and unifying themes
in Justice Brennan's jurisprudence of labor law to explain every
labor decision written or every position taken by Brennan during
34. See, e.g., Charles W. Dorman, Justice Brennan: The Individual and Labor Law, 58
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1003, 1007-12 (1982) (discussing Justice Brennan's consistent emphasis
on individual rights in employer-employee conflicts).
35. As one journalist noted, "Court scholars see Justice Brennan as the embodiment
of the Warren Court's concern for individual rights." Marcia Coyle, A Final Victory
Marks the End of a Career, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at S4; see also Richard S. Arnold,
Mr. Justice Brennan - An Appreciation, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 7 (1991) ("The
Brennan role in securing the distinctly American heritage of individual liberty is univer-
sally acknowledged."); Daniel J. O'Hern, Foreword: In Honor of William J. Brennan, Jr.,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 5, 8 (1991) (characterizing Justice Brennan's 'enduring legacy" as
"the preservation of the Bill of Rights by an independent judiciary"). See generally Justice
Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2
(1990) (discussing Justice Brennan's "unwavering commitment to ...basic principles of
civil rights and civil liberties").
36. See infra notes 302-39 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 353-79 and accompanying text.
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his time - more than three decades - on the Supreme Court. Surely
no judge's ideology can be so neatly pigeonholed, particularly
after a career as long as Justice Brennan's. Nor do I suggest
that Brennan himself would have admitted to a coherent and
consistent vision of labor relations if he had been asked to
articulate his general views on the topic. Brennan's comments in
other contexts indicate that he was a firm believer in change
and evolution of ideology, especially when influenced by the
enormous responsibility inherent in the position of Supreme
Court Justice.3 My more modest goal is to explore some of the
common threads that appear repeatedly in many of Justice
Brennan's labor decisions. Those threads, I contend, indicate a
vision of industrial relations much broader and richer than the
concern for individual rights most often associated with Brennan's
positions. In this area, unlike others,3 9 the importance of these
considerations led him to restrict judicial scrutiny rather than
expand it.40
A. Free Play of the "Market"
Justice Brennan's concerns about economic freedom and limi-
ting judicial supervision of labor-management relations emerge
in several lines of cases. Perhaps the most significant illustrations
are his opinions protecting the parties' use of economic weapons
and a related series of preemption cases, although other decisions
38. For example, in responding to a question about perceived changes in positions
taken by Justice O'Connor, Justice Brennan stated: " 'A change in a new Justice is so
often a product of the significance of this responsibility-of being a Justice - and it is
something you simply have no idea of until you get it.'" Leeds, supra note 12, at 78
(quoting from an interview with Justice Brennan); see also Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 33, 36 (1990) (quoting Justice Brennan:
"Once you get here, and you have that fabulous document to apply, and that becomes
your responsibility, things that you hadn't seen . . . suddenly become apparent.").
39. The suggestion that in areas of constitutional interpretation Justice Brennan gen-
erally favored strong assertions of judicial power would surprise no one. See WILLIAM J.
BRENNAN, JR., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION
(1985), reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
23, 24-25 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (stating that "judges must resolve" the meaning of
the Constitution and that they are empowered "to invalidate the expressed desires of
representative bodies on the ground of inconsistency with higher law"); see also Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-13 (1982) (taking expansive view of judicial role in enforcing the
Equal Protection Clause); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing
broad view of judicial power under Article III); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)
(same).
40. See infra notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
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also reflect similar themes. Depending on their relative economic
strengths, employers and unions have both benefitted from and
been burdened by Justice Brennan's approach.
1. Deregulating Economic Weapons
Justice Brennan issued his first opinion construing the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) less than six months after his recess
appointment to the Court and within days of his permanent
commission.41 His decision in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union
No. 449 (Buffalo Linen)42 was an important one, although not
particularly enlightening about his philosophy of labor relations.
Buffalo Linen presented Justice Brennan with his first opportu-
nity to consider restrictions on the use of economic weapons.
The issue involved the right of employers in a multi-employer
bargaining association to temporarily lock out their employees in
response to a "whipsaw" strike against one of their members.43
By temporarily locking out all of their employees, the association
maintained a united front and a competitive balance. The National
Labor Relations Board rejected the union's unfair labor practice
charge, equating the employer's lockout with the union's right to
strike .44
Justice Brennan's relatively brief analysis first defended the
existence of multi-employer associations as a necessary response
to "increased union strength.."45 He interpreted Congress' refusal
to outlaw multi-employer bargaining during the debates on the
Taft-Hartley amendments 46 as approval of the Board's continued
41. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan's first NLRA decision,
issued on April 1, 1957, was NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
42. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
43. Id. at 89-90. A whipsaw strike involves a "divide and conquer" strategy. The lone
struck employer is likely to lose business to his fellow association members, thus putting
strong pressure on him to capitulate to the union's demands. Once that is accomplished,
the union then strikes a second employer. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447,
448 (1954), enforcement denied sub nom. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 v. NLRB, 231
F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
44. Buffalo Linen, 109 N.L.R.B. at 448-49.
45. Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 94-95. One might suggest that the analysis reflects Justice
Brennan's background as a management labor lawyer. See FRANK, supra note 8, at 116-
18.
46. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 6-8 (1947) (explaining the potential
disruptive effects of banning industry-wide bargaining and noting that "[a]ny attempt to
ban actions by employers to form voluntary associations for the purpose of collective
bargaining would deny this group the protection afforded employee organizations"); 93
CONG. REC. 1834-44, 4443-44, 4581-87, 4674-76 (1947) (discussing and rejecting a proposed
amendment to condition industry-wide bargaining on the voluntary consent of the unions
who bargain together).
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certification of multi-employer bargaining units.47 Brennan con-
cluded that the balancing of "conflicting legitimate interests"
must be left to the Board's expertise with "limited judicial
review." 48
When Justice Brennan next confronted the problem of eco-
nomic weapons, just three years later, his tone and analysis had
changed considerably. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International
Union,49 Justice Brennan addressed the relationship between a
union's duty to bargain in good faith and the employees' use of
various tactics intended to harass the employer. ° Following the
expiration of the old collective-bargaining agreement, the insur-
ance agents represented by the union embarked on a campaign
to pressure their employer, which included, among other things,
refusing to solicit new business, refusing to comply with reporting
procedures, reporting late at district offices, refusing to perform
office duties, and picketing at company offices.51 The Board found
the union in violation of S 8(b)(3) of the NLRA52 for failure to
bargain in good faith.5
Justice Brennan responded with a lengthy opinion beginning
with an extensive history of the Act's duty-to-bargain provisions. 4
He replaced his deference to the Board's balancing of conflicting
interests in Buffalo Linen with a theme that recurred in various
forms in his opinions throughout the next thirty years. Brennan
embraced the availability of economic weapons as a key to the
structure of industrial relations created by the NLRA, rather
than something to be carefully scrutinized and restricted by the
Board and the courts.5 He removed from the Board any authority
to regulate the parties' choice of economic weapons.5 Such au-
thority, he believed, would give the Board too much control over
the parties' respective bargaining power, thus influencing sub-
stantive terms of the parties' agreement.57 Justice Brennan con-
veyed his message unequivocally: the Board was not to act as an
47. Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 95-96.
48. Id. at 96.
49. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
50. Id. at 479.
51. Id. at 480-81.
52. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(3) (1988).
53. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 772 (1957), enforcement denied, 260
F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
54. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 483-88.
55. Id. at 488-92.
56. Id. at 497-500.
57. Id. at 498.
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arbiter of economic weapons beyond those devices that Congress
specifically outlawed.5
In the factual context of Insurance Agents, the use and success
of the employees' harassing tactics thus depended on the relative
strengths of the parties. The agents' behavior was not unlawful,
but neither was it protected.59 The employer was free to discipline
or fire its difficult employees for failure to perform their jobs
fully.6 0 In deciding whether to respond by discharging the agents,
however, the employer presumably would consider the skill of
those individuals and the ease of replacement, as well as the
impact on collective bargaining. By the same token, the union
would consider the same issues to determine the risk of termi-
nation before embarking on such a course. The tactics used by
the insurance agents here rarely would be used by unskilled
employees who the employer could replace quickly. The choice
of economic weapons under Justice Brennan's scheme therefore
was significantly influenced by relevant "market" factors such as
the skill level of the bargaining unit, the unemployment rate, the
strength of union support, and the employer's economic health
and ability to withstand a diminution or shutdown of production.
The unregulated use of economic weapons became a familiar
theme for Justice Brennan once he established his position in
Insurance Agents. The problem of multi-employer bargaining units
and whipsaw strikes reappeared in NLRB v. Brown.6 1 Having
settled the right to lock out in Buffalo Linen,62 the Court now
considered the question of whether the nonstruck employers
could hire temporary replacements after locking out their regular,
nonstriking employees. In Brown, the struck employer continued
operations with replacement employees hired lawfully under the
Court's well-established rule in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele-
graph Co.63 The other association members then locked out their
employees to support their struck member and to protect the
integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit 4 Instead of shut-
58. Id.
59. Id. at 492.
60. Id. at 492-94.
61. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
62. 353 U.S. 87 (1957); see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
63. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Mackay Radio established the employer's right to hire permanent
replacements in response to an economic strike. Id. at 345-46. The Court in Brown, on
the other hand, specifically addressed only the issue of whether temporary replacements
could be hired following a lockout in response to a whipsaw strike. Brown, 380 U.S. at
292 n.6.
64. Brown, 380 U.S. at 282.
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ting down and risking the loss of business to the struck employer,
however, the nonstruck members hired temporary replacements
to maintain operations.6 5
The Board had condemned the employers' behavior as a vio-
lation of SS 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).66 Justice Brennan, however, viewed
the hiring of temporary replacements as a legitimate extension
of the lockout in defense of the whipsaw strike, absent evidence
of improper motivation.67 Quoting from Insurance Agents, he re-
minded the Board that it was not to act as "'arbiter of the sort
of economic weapons the parties can use.' "68 The inability to
operate with temporary replacements, Brennan reasoned, would
place the nonstruck employers at a competitive disadvantage
with the struck employer continuing to operate with striker
replacements-in effect, shifting the pressure intended by the
whipsaw strike device from the struck employer to the remaining
association members.6 9 If the nonstruck members were unable to
remain open with replacements, customers could be lost to the
struck employer. 70 Not permitting the use of temporary replace-
ments thus would force the nonstruck employers to choose be-
tween protecting the multi-employer association and protecting
their competitive positions.71
Justice Brennan readily acknowledged that the employers'
actions significantly diluted the impact of the union's strike. But
that impact, he suggested, was simply a by-product of the "mar-
ket" forces:
It is no doubt true that the collective strength of the stores
to resist that strike is maintained, and even increased, when
all stores stay open with temporary replacements. The pres-
sures on the employees are necessarily greater when none of
the union employees is working and the stores remain open.
But these pressures are no more than the result of the Local's
inability to make effective use of the whipsaw tactic.72
Justice Brennan's concern with the regulation of economic
weapons achieved sharper focus in his 1971 dissenting opinion in
65. Id. at 282-83.
66. Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 76-77 (1962) (citing 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), (3)
(1988)), enforcement denied, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), affid, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
67. Brown, 380 U.S. at 283.
68. Id. (quoting Insurance Agents' Int'l Union v. NLRB, 361 U.S. 477, 497 (1960)).
69. Id. at 284-85.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 286.
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Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation
Union.3 Although the opinion is hardly one of his best known, it
reveals a great deal of Justice Brennan's evolving philosophy of
labor law and the role of the judiciary. In Insurance Agents,
Justice Brennan reasoned that the control of economic weapons
could determine relative bargaining power and ultimately influ-
ence the substantive terms of the parties' agreement. 74 In his
Chicago & North Western Railway dissent, Brennan further ar-
gued that interference with economic weapons hindered the vol-
untary settlement that would otherwise be encouraged by the
threat and use of those weapons during collective bargaining.75
Chicago & North Western Railway arose under the Railway
Labor Act (RLA).7 6 An employer who sought to enjoin a threat-
ened strike by the United Transportation Union initiated the
action.7 The parties had negotiated unsuccessfully concerning the
elimination of brakemen's jobs.78 The union complied with statu-
tory procedures for mediation and a thirty-day cooling-off period.79
Following the lapse of the thirty-day period, the railroad filed
suit to enjoin the union from striking on the grounds that the
union had failed "to exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements" as required under 5 2, First of the RLA. 0
In spite of the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,8 ' the
majority of the Court permitted the issuance of an injunction as
the only practical and effective means of enforcing S 2, First.82
Justice Brennan extensively reviewed the legislative history
of the RLA and § 2, First. 3 In the end, he found the RLA and
the NLRA to be parallel schemes for the issue presented to the
Court.8 Judicial interference in a collective bargaining relation-
73. 402 U.S. 570, 584 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
75. Chicago & North W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
77. Chicago & North W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 571.
78. Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 586; see 45 U.S.C. S 155, First (permitting either party to invoke the services
of the Mediation Board and requiring that both parties maintain the status quo for 30
days following the failure of mediation).
80. Chicago & North W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see 45 U.S.C.
152, First.
81. 29 U.S.C. SS 101-115 (1988). The Norris-LaGuardia Act generally prohibits federal
courts from issuing an injunction in any "case involving or growing out of a labor dispute:'
Id. § 101; see infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text.
82. Chicago & North W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 581-84.
83. Id. at 588-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 595-96.
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ship, Justice Brennan asserted, should be limited to maintaining
the structure of the union-employer relationship. As he stated,
"judicial involvement in the railway bargaining process was to
be minuscule since the entire focus of the Act was toward
achieving a voluntary settlement between the protagonists."85
Both the RLA and the NLRA provided the "means" to achieve
settlement, Brennan emphasized, not the settlement itself. 6 Cit-
ing Insurance Agents, he described the majority's position as a
"mortal wound" to the role of economic weapons in collective
bargaining.87
Justice Brennan, however, did not endorse limitless access to
any and all economic weapons. He found restrictions necessary
when the use of weapons crossed the boundary between promot-
ing the settlement of industrial dispute and destroying the rela-
tionship entirely. For example, in Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(TWA) v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,8 the Court
considered the legality under the RLA of hiring permanent
replacements for striking flight attendants.8 9 The specific issue
involved the airline's policy, announced before and during the
strike, that at the conclusion of the strike, senior striking em-
ployees would not be permitted to displace crossovers -union
employees who had continued working during part or all of the
strike.90 This policy thus created an incentive for junior flight
attendants to abandon the strike to obtain the more attractive
job assignments usually available only to more senior fRight
85. Id. at 596.
86. Id. (quoting Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6
(1943)).
87. Id. at 597-98 (citing Insurance Agents' Int'l Union v. NLRB, 361 U.S. 477, 494
(1960)). Seventeen years later, in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Brotherhood of Main-
tenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987), Justice Brennan reaffirmed his philosophy
in a case involving secondary picketing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan
concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited the federal courts from enjoining
such activity:
"Underlying the entire statutory framework is the pressure born of the
knowledge that in the final instance traditional self-help economic pressure
may be brought to bear if the statutory mechanism does not produce
agreement. . . . As the statutory machinery nears termination without
achieving settlement, the threat of economic self-help and the pressures of
informed public opinion create new impetus toward compromise and agree-
ment."
Id. at 452 (quoting Chicago & North W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
88. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
89. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938), established the right
to hire permanent employees to replace economic strikes under the NLRA.
90. TWA, 489 U.S. at 430.
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attendants through the seniority bidding system.91 Similarly, the
practice encouraged senior employees to return to work to pro-
tect their prior job assignments. 92 To the extent openings were
available after the strike, however, the striking employees re-
turned to work with full seniority intact.93 The majority of the
Court agreed with TWA that to permit the strikers to displace
crossovers who worked during the strike would be unfair because
the newly hired replacement employees received protection from
such displacement.94 Justice Brennan dissented, however, finding
the policy "inherently destructive" of the union's right to strike.95
Brennan rejected as unpersuasive the anomaly found by the
majority in allowing newly hired replacements to remain yet
permitting senior returning strikers to displace crossovers. 9 That
problem was created by seniority, he argued, not by the question
of which employees choose to remain on strike.97 The hiring of
permanent replacements is distinguishable: the threat of hiring
permanent replacements pressured the striking employees as a
group while TWA's policy encouraged individual workers to
betray the strike.98 Brennan found the displacement necessary to
assure the unity critical to successful union representation.99 He
thus was willing in some sense to "sacrifice" the dissenters to
maintain the solidarity of the unit.100 The individual rights of the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 434-39. The Court further rejected the union's argument that the RLA
forbade the company's policy, irrespective of the legality under the NLRA. Id. at 439-42.
95. Id. at 443 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In analyzing the issue presented, Justice Brennan
found no relevant distinctions between the NLRA and the RLA. Id. at 446.
96. Id. at 446.
97. Id. at 447.
98. Id- at 447-49.
99. Id- at 448 n.4.
100. Justice Brennan's affirmative action opinions demonstrated an analogous rationale.
His position in TWA required that some bargaining unit employees, the crossovers, be
sacrificed to protect the unity of the group. His support of affirmative action, in the face
of constitutional and statutory challenges, served much the same function. Because of
past discrimination against a protected group, Brennan was willing to promote the welfare
of the class despite the effect of sacrificing majority individuals who might otherwise be
entitled to the position or opportunity on a color-blind or gender-blind basis. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 623-25 (1987) (holding employer could
lawfully consider gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights, Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1 to -17 (1988), in selecting qualified applicant with lower score for position in which
women historically had been underrepresented); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 197-99 (1979) (upholding training program under Title VII which reserved half of the
spaces for blacks to improve representation of blacks in skilled positions); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted a university's
admissions program to reserve positions for minority applicants).
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crossovers thus took a backseat to what Brennan considered-
at least in this context-to be the greater good of the group.
Justice Brennan characterized TWA's action as analogous to
the employer's tactics in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.1 1 In Erie
Resistor, the Court condemned as "inherently .. .destructive"
an employer's offer of twenty years seniority to replacement
workers and employees who abandoned the strike to return to
work.102 Justice Brennan believed the conclusion in Erie Resistor
was equally applicable in TWA:
Beyond its specific holding outlawing superseniority, I read
Erie Resistor to stand for the principle that there are certain
tools an employer may not use, even in the interest of contin-
ued operations during a strike, and that the permissibility of
discriminatory measures taken for that purpose must be eval-
uated by weighing the "necessity" of the employer's action
(i.e., its interest in maintaining operations during the strike)
against its prejudice to the employees' right to strike ...
...Unfortunately there will be individual injustices which-
ever rule we adopt. I would favor -and I believe Congress has
provided for-the rule that errs on the side of preferring
solidarity and seniority, rather than a rule that would permit
the employer to discriminate on the basis of protected union
activity.103
"Inherently destructive" might also describe Justice Brennan's
rationale in NLRB v. Katz.04 Writing for a unanimous Court,05
he condemned the employer's attempt to bypass the collective-
bargaining process entirely by unilaterally changing conditions
of employment during negotiations. In the midst of bargaining,
the employer had granted merit wage increases, had instituted
a new sick-leave policy, and had created a new system of auto-
matic pay raises. The employer argued that a finding of bad faith
was a prerequisite for a 5 8(a)(5) violation of the duty "to bargain
collectively."'' 06 Brennan found that "to bargain collectively" as
defined in § 8(d) 107 required both actual bargaining and negotiating
in good faith.10 8 The good faith question arose only after the
101. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
102. Id. at 228.
103. TWA, 489 U.S. at 449, 451-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
104. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
105. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision.
106. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(5) (1988).
107. Id. S 158(d).
108. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743.
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bargaining obligation was satisfied. The unilateral changes, he
declared, were "a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrate[d] the objectives of § 8(a)(5)" much like a "flat refusal"
to bargain at all.0 9 Returning to the lessons of NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' International Union,"0 Brennan distinguished his refusal
in that case to restrict the union's economic weapons as part of
the bargaining obligations:
We held [in Insurance Agents] that Congress had not, in
8(a)(3), the counterpart of § 8(a)(5), empowered the Board to
pass judgment on the legitimacy of any particular economic
weapon used in support of genuine negotiations. But the Board
is authorized to order the cessation of behavior which is in
effect a refusal to negotiate, or which directly obstructs or
inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which reflects a
cast of mind against reaching agreement. Unilateral action by
an employer without prior discussion with the union does
amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions
of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity ob-
struct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy."'
In Justice Brennan's thinking, therefore, some supervision of
the process of collective bargaining was a necessary corollary to
the largely unregulated use of economic weapons. The availability
of economic warfare would prove effective in promoting voluntary
settlements, resulting in industrial peace, only if the collective-
bargaining process remained intact. When the employer under-
mined that process, by refusing to bargain as in Katz or by
destroying employee solidarity as in TWA, Brennan's labor re-
lations philosophy mandated judicial intervention. Similarly, as
this Article will develop more fully in Part II(B)(1)(a), Brennan
did not hesitate to intervene when the union itself threatened to
destroy employee unity by silencing dissenters or using union
dues for expenditures peripheral to its collective-bargaining ob-
ligations.112
2. Preemption
Justice Brennan's concern with protecting the "market" of
economic weapons is reflected from another angle in a series of
109. Id
110. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
111. Katz, 369 U.S. at 747.
112. See infra notes 302-19 and accompanying text.
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preemption decisions. On a general level, Justice Brennan's writ-
ten opinions consistently advocated the application of preemption
to eliminate state courts' involvement in-or, as Justice Brennan
might say, "interference" with-labor-management relations. Of
the many opinions considering preemption and the NLRA that
Justice Brennan wrote (including four dissenting opinions), all
but two find state law completely preempted or strictly limited
by federal labor law and policy."3
More significant, however, is the connection between Justice
Brennan's economic weapons theory and the preemption arena
which he first developed in Lodge 76, International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission."1 The facts involved in Machinists were rem-
iniscent of NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union."5
113. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621, 638-39 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a state law denying unemployement benefits to an individual
who finances a labor dispute causing his unemployment conflicts with the NLRA); Belknap,
Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 524 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating suit based on state
law by former employees who claimed they had been hired as permanent replacements
for striking workers "go[es] to the core of federal labor policy"); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 214-15 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that provisions in the NLRA indicated that state courts were
powerless to enjoin "peaceful, nonobstructive picketing of Sears' store" and that the
trespass was protected); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154-55 (1976) (holding "refusal to
work overtime [was] peaceful conduct constituting activity" which federal law preempts
the states from regulating); Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1974) (holding
North Carolina law that required employees to grant supervisors the status of employees
violates Congress' policy against such requirement); Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v.
American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 122-24 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
Congress meant to regulate union picketing of foreign vessels); International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200 (1970) (holding "It]he
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is exclusive and pre-emptive as to
activities" regulated under the Act); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729-31
(1966) (explaining that although state law can address violence occurring in labor disputes,
its scope is "strictly confined to the direct consequences of such conduct, and does not
include consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing or other union activity");
Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 617 (1959) (holding "respondent's submission to
the Board of his grievances as to the validity of his discharge precludes him from seeking
damages in the instant common law action").
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Engineers
Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 195 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring), found no preemption
of a state's regulation of picketing for a supervisory union. His opinion in Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987), also rejected a preemption argument and
upheld a Maine statute requiring severance pay for employees who were fired due to
plant closings.
114. 427 U.S. 132. This case was not Justice Brennan's first preemption decision. He
wrote his first opinion addressing the issue in 1959. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360
U.S. 601 (1959).
115. 361 U.S. 477 (1961).
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After bargaining to impasse with the union, the employer an-
nounced his intent to increase unilaterally the basic workweek
from thirty-seven and one-half to forty hours per week.116 The
union responded by a concerted refusal to work beyond thirty-
seven and one-half hours.17 Under the authority of Insurance
Agents, the Regional Director of the NLRB dismissed the em-
ployer's charge against the union for refusal to bargain under
5 8(b)(3).1 8 The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,
however, found the refusal to work overtime to be an unfair
labor practice under state law and issued an order enjoining the
union's action.119
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan provided a compre-
hensive review of preemption theory. He began by dividing the
preemption cases into two categories: (1) those involving a direct
conflict between two forums in which activity would be legal in
one but prohibited in the other and (2) those in which the state
law might restrict or interfere with federally protected rights.120
In turn, preemption by the NLRA could be based either on the
federal protection for the activity or the primary jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board.12' Under the seminal case of
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,'22 preemption
theory barred a state from regulating conduct arguably protected
by 5 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA. 23 Presumably, Brennan
found the Garnon line of decisions to be consistent with the first
116. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 134.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 135; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1988).
119. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 134-36.
120. Id. at 138.
121. Id. (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 383 n.19 (1969)).
122. 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1988); see Machinists, 427 U.S. at 13839. The preemption
problem in labor law is a difficult and sometimes tortured issue. I make no attempt to
fully analyze or resolve those problems here. See generally Archibald Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972) (criticizing the balance of power
Congress established with the preemption doctrine in labor law); Archibald Cox, Recent
Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980) (discussing
inconsistences with recent labor law opinions); Frank I. Michelman, State Power to Govern
Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1961) (explaining the problems of
accommodating both national and state interests in labor relations); Lee Modjeska,
Federalism in Labor Relations-The Last Decade, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 487 (1989) (discussing
current problems with labor preemption); Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a New
Approach to Federal Preemption of Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 YALE L.J. 209
(1989) (discussing federal law preemption of lawsuits arising from collective-bargaining
agreements).
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category of preemption cases that intended to avoid a direct
conflict between state and federal law.
Liner v. Jafco, Inc.124 is a good example of a primary jurisdiction
case. The respondent in Jafco obtained an ex parte injunction
from a state court prohibiting a union trades council from pick-
eting a nonunion construction site.125 Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan found the dispute to be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB under the Garmon principle. 26 The
state injunction could frustrate federal labor policy, he explained,
both by creating inconsistencies in application and by discour-
aging employers from utilizing Board processes.'2
A second line of preemption cases was more critical to Justice
Brennan's vision of the judicial role in labor-management rela-
tions. Here, as Brennan explained in Machinists, the question
was "whether Congress intended that the conduct involved be
unregulated because left [sic] 'to be controlled by the free play
of economic forces.' "128 In these cases, preemption operated to
prevent judicial interference with the "market" of economic weap-
ons available to the parties. As he described in Machinists:
Our decisions hold that Congress meant that these activities,
whether of employer or employees, were not to be regulable
by States any more than by the NLRB, for neither States nor
the Board is "afforded flexibility in picking and choosing which
economic devices of labor and management shall be branded
as unlawful." Rather, both are without authority to attempt to
"introduce some standard of properly 'balanced' bargaining
power," or to define "what economic sanctions might be per-
mitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced' state of
collective bargaining."'129
Thus, Justice Brennan concluded in Machinists that the injunction
issued by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission pro-
hibiting the union's refusal to work overtime was preempted as
124. 375 U.S. 301 (1964).
125. Id. at 304.
126. Id. at 306.
127. Id. at 307.
128. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nasf-Finch Co., 404 U.S.
138, 144 (1971)).
129. Id. at 149-50 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-
98, 500 (1961)).
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a direct frustration of the use of economic pressure protected by
the NLRA. 130
Even within the more traditional Garmon preemption problem
of conduct arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by S 8 of the
Act, Justice Brennan was guided by his concern for the unres-
tricted use of economic weapons. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County District Council of Carpenters,13 1 decided just two
years after Machinists, the Court permitted a California state
court to enjoin picketing on the employer's property. 132 The
majority rejected the preemption claim, finding that the trespass
issue was sufficiently distinct from the unfair labor practice issue,
particularly when the union had failed to raise the issue with
the Board by filing an unfair labor practice charge. 1'
In his dissent, Justice Brennan explored the distinctions be-
tween the "arguably protected" and "arguably prohibited" prongs
of the Garmon formulation. When activity was arguably prohib-
ited under 5 8 of the NLRA, preemption was justified by concerns
that state courts might misapply federal law or provide different
forms of relief.13 Exceptions were well-established, however, such
as the states' rights to regulate mass picketing and violence
involving "'such traditionally local matters as public safety and
order.' "135
When activities were arguably protected by § 7 of the Act,
Justice Brennan argued, different issues surfaced. Here, a state
court's interference involved the more serious danger that the
states might prohibit conduct protected by the NLRA. 136 In the
facts presented, for example, the California court's order pre-
vented effective picketing at Sears for thirty-five days.1' As
Brennan asserted, such an order "may well have irreparably
altered the balance of the competing economic forces by prohib-
130. Id. at 148-49 ("[T]he economic weakness of the affected party cannot justify state
aid contrary to federal law for, as we have developed, 'the use of economic pressure...
is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining.' ").
131. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
132. Id. at 193, 207.
133. Id. at 207.
134. Id. at 218 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 220-21 (quoting Allan-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical, Radio, &
Machine Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942)).
136. Id. at 216.
137. Id. at 182-83 (majority opinion). By enjoining the Union's trespass on Sears'
property, the Court required that the picketing be relocated to a public sidewalk 150 to
200 feet away. Id. at 225-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A Union representative testified
that picketing at such a distance from the store rendered the picketing ineffective and
caused the Union to abandon it altogether. Id. at 226 n.10.
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iting the Union's use of a permissible economic weapon at a
crucial time."13 8
Justice Brennan reaffirmed this theme five years later while
dissenting from the majority's opinion in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale.13 9
The employees in Belknap called a strike after bargaining to
impasse for a new collective-bargaining agreement. 140 Shortly
thereafter, the employer granted a unilateral wage increase,
arguably converting the strike from an economic strike to an
unfair labor practice strike.'4' The employer hired "permanent"
replacements but later laid off those employees to reinstate the
strikers, pursuant to a settlement agreement with the union in
exchange for the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges. 42 The
replacements then sued the employer in state court for breach
of contract and misrepresentation.4 3 The majority rejected the
employer's preemption defense. 144
Justice Brennan reached a different conclusion. The breach of
contract claim, he maintained, created a direct conflict between
the alleged contractual obligations and the employer's potential
duty under federal law to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers.
Brennan believed such a direct conflict presented a classic case
for preemption. 145 According to Brennan, the misrepresentation
claim also was preempted because of the possible interference
with one of the employers' most significant economic weapons-
the right to hire striker replacements:
In order to avoid misrepresentation claims, an employer might
decide not to hire replacements on a permanent basis or to
hire permanent replacements only in cases in which it is
absolutely clear that the strike is an economic one. Either of
these developments would mean that employers were being
inhibited by state law from making full use of an economic
weapon available to them under federal law.146
138. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's advocacy of a strong pre-
emption doctrine was generally at odds with the majority sentiment during this period.
See David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last
Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 531-50 (1986) (discussing erosion of labor preemption
doctrine by the Burger Court in the 1970's).
139. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
140. Id. at 493-94.
141. Id. at 494-95.
142. Id. at 496.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 512. In rejecting the employer's defense of preemption, the majority cited
the states' "substantial interest in protecting its citizens from misrepresentations" and
"providing remedy to its citizens for breach of contract." Id. at 511-12.
145. Id. at 528-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 537.
1144 [Vol. 33:1123
1992] THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE BRENNAN 1145
Justice Brennan's rationale in Belknap is surprising for anyone
who views Brennan primarily as pro-employee or an advocate of
individual rights. Apart from the preemption issue limiting state
court interference, the opinion demonstrated his deep commit-
ment to protecting the parties' right to economic warfare. First,
Brennan reaffirmed the availability of one of the employer's most
powerful weapons-the right to hire permanent replacements-
at a time when many labor sympathizers were advocating the
elimination of that weapon as itself "inherently destructive" of
the right to strike.147 Second, he took a position that sacrificed
the "innocent" replacements and arguably left them without a
remedy against the employer for breach of her promise of per-
manent employment.
3. Curbing Judicial Intervention
Closely related to the preemption cases are those decisions in
which Justice Brennan sought explicit limitations on judicial
interference with labor relations. The free use of economic weap-
ons, as a key component of the process of collective bargaining
advocated by Brennan, necessarily required carefully circum-
147. See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
19-34 (1983) (discussing the right of the employer to hire permanent replacements as
destructive of the right to strike); Richard L. Trumka, Future of the NLRB: From the
Union's Standpoint, THmD ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 325, 331
(Marlin M. Volz ed., 1987) (asserting that "American workers have no real right to strike"
because if they strike, they effectively are fired by being replaced); Samuel Estreicher,
Strikers and Replacements, 38 LABOR L.J. 287, 288-89 (1987) (discussing the NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938), doctrine of permitting employer
replacement of striking workers); Hal K. Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of
Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972) (suggesting the need for judicial reconsid-
eration of the Mackay doctrine); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions
Concerning a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEx. L. REV. 378, 382-95
(1969) (discussing how the individual worker has been ignored by economic weapons such
as the employer's right to hire replacements). But see David Westfall, Striker Replacements
and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. LAW. 137 (1991) (discussing proposed legislation
to change the Mackay doctrine and concluding Congress should not make radical changes
to a doctrine that "has served us well for over half a century by providing balanced
protection for all of the relevant interests affected by the replacement of economic
strikers"). In fact, legislation recently was introduced in Congress to amend both the
NLRA and the RLA to prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements during a labor
dispute. See H.R. 3936, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2112, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
cf. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1987-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-03 (1978):
[Mackay] furthered the principle that the Act is disinterested in the sub-
stantive justice of the labor contract since it taught that not only would the
wage-bargain not ordinarily be subject to substantive scrutiny, but also that
the economic combat of the parties had replaced a "meeting of the minds"
as the moral basis of labor contractualism.
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scribed judicial involvement. Such a concern was consistent with
his broader thesis that the control of economic weapons inhibited
voluntary settlements and improperly influenced the parties'
substantive agreements. 148 A judicial willingness to review and
alter decisions by the parties, and even the Board, thus merely
encouraged resort to the courts for resolution of conflicts. Vol-
untary settlement diminished when the parties could rely on
judicial review as an alternative to achieving their objectives.
In one of his first labor opinions, Justice Brennan challenged
the Court's decision to permit an employer to bypass usual Board
procedures and sue in federal district court. In Leedom v. Kyne,4 9
the Board had included in a bargaining unit both professional
and nonprofessional employees without first determining whether
the professional employees approved of such a unit. 5) Section
9(b)(1) of the Act specifically states that "the Board shall not (1)
decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit
includes both professional employees and employees who are not
professional employees unless a majority of such professional
employees vote for inclusion in such unit."' 5' The Board found
S 9(b)(1) inapplicable when 233 out of 242 members of the unit
were professional employees, reasoning that S 9(b)(1) protection
would be unnecessary in such a case.5 2
The usual procedure for obtaining judicial review of a unit
determination by the Board is for an employer to refuse to
bargain with the certified union if the union wins the election. 1'
The employer then defends the 5 8(a)(5)19 charge l5y challenging
the appropriateness of the unit. Once the Board renders its
decision (often by summary judgment), the employer may appeal
to the circuit court of appeals. 5 5 In Leedom, however, the em-
ployer filed suit in federal district court to set aside the unit
148. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's views
on the need for availability of economic weapons).
149. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
150. Id. at 185.
151. 29 U.S.C. 5 159(b)(1) (1988).
152. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1420, 1423-24, rev'd sub nom. Kyne v.
Leedom, 148 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957), and affid, 358
U.S. 184 (1958); cf. Leedom, 358 U.S. at 198 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the Board's
ruling that approval of the professional employees is required only when the professionals
are a minority when compared to the number of nonprofessionals).
153. Leedom, 358 U.S. at 194-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5).
155. See Leedom, 358 U.S. at 192-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing appellate review
of Board decisions).
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determination.1' The majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
district court's jurisdiction. 157 The Court justified the bypass of
normal channels as necessary to prevent the "'sacrifice or oblit-
eration of a right'" explicitly granted by Congress in S 9(b)(1). 15
Once again relying heavily on legislative history, Justice
Brennan decried the "gaping hole" the majority created in the
"congressional wall against direct resort to the courts" estab-
lished by the Act.15 9 Congress, he contended, was fully aware of
the disadvantages of such a cumbersome review process. 60 None-
theless, the legislature concluded that if immediate judicial in-
tervention were permitted, potential for delay and abuse would
outweigh those disadvantages. 6' Justice Brennan explained: "In
short, Congress set itself firmly against direct judicial review of
the investigation and certification of representatives, and re-
quired the prompt initiation of the collective-bargaining process
after the Board's certification, because of the risk that time-
consuming review might defeat the objectives of the national
labor policy."'6 2 Brennan found no basis for any exceptions.163
Similarly, Justice Brennan chastised both the circuit courts
and the Supreme Court for interfering with the Board's settle-
ment and remedial authority. In NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp.,'"
for example, the parties agreed to a consent order that prohibited
the employer from conditioning employment on union member-
ship, provided the union exclusive hiring control, and allowed for
checkoff of union dues and fees. 66 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit altered the scope of the order sua
sponte to limit it to the particular union-employer relationship
involved in the original unfair labor practice charge.166 Despite
156. See Leedom, 148 F. Supp. at 601.
157. Leedom, 358 U.S. at 191.
158. Id. at 190 (quoting Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297,
300 (1943)).
159. Id. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 192.
161. Id.
162. Id at 192-93. Justice Brennan distinguished those cases upon which the majority
relied as situations in which Congress created a right but no enforcement mechanism
and explained that, in contrast, the NLRA carefully outlined the means by which Board
decisions were reviewed. Id. at 200-01.
163. See id. at 194 ("There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the
Congress intended any exception:').
164. 368 U.S. 318 (1961).
165. Id. at 319.
166. See NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 321 (1961) (discussing the
appellate Court's sua sponte modification of the consent order), rev'g 283 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.
1960).
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the absence of facts to support the Board's broad injunction,
Brennan found that the circuit court had no authority to alter
its terms. He stated: "[W]e think that consent . ..relieves the
Board of the very necessity of making a supporting record. A
decree rendered by consent 'is always affirmed, without consid-
ering the merits of the cause.' "167 In NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 28,16 Justice Brennan, again
writing for the majority, found no impediment in either the
NLRA or the Administrative Procedure Act 169 to the General
Counsel's approval of a settlement after the filing of a complaint.
Such a decision, the Court held, was within the General Counsel's
discretion and not subject to judicial review.170
NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347171 and Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB72 both considered appellate court authority
to alter Board-determined remedies. In Food Store Employees,
Justice Brennan, on behalf of a unanimous Court, criticized the
court of appeals for expanding a Board remedial order.173 The
Court held that the Board had broad discretion in the area and
any inconsistencies in the Board's position should have been
presented first to the Board on remand.17 4 In Sure-Tan, Justice
Brennan's partial dissent objected to the majority's creation of a
new standard of review for NLRB remedial orders.175 The Court
majority questioned whether the Board's remedies, adopted as
suggested by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, were
"sufficiently tailored" to the unfair labor practice found.176 Bren-
nan defended the "limited" review authority expressed in earlier
opinions.177 In his view, a Board order "'"should stand unless it
can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends
other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies
of the Act .... 178
167. Ochoa Fertilizer, 368 U.S. at 323 (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
v. United States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885)).
168. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
169. 5 U.S.C. §5 701-706 (1988).
170. United Food, 484 U.S. at 133.
171. 417 U.S. 1 (1974).
172. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
173. Food Store Employees, 417 U.S. at 8.
174. Id. at 9-10.
175. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 907.
176. Id. at 889-90, 901-04.
177. Id. at 898-906 (discussing limited judicial review of NLRB decisions).
178. Id. at 907 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953) (quoting
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943))).
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4. The Scope of S 8(b)(4)
In protecting economic weapons from Board and judicial inter-
ference, Justice Brennan noted often that Congress carefully
proscribed some economic pressure under some circumstances,
thus implying its intent to leave other weapons unregulated. 79
Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 18 directed at secondary boycotts,
represents one of the more significant limitations on union activ-
ity. Justice Brennan interpreted § 8(b)(4) narrowly, however, so
as to maximize the union's free use of economic weapons.
Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) prohibits unions from "engag[ing] in . . . a
strike or a refusal in the course of his [sic] employment to use
. . . or otherwise handle or work on any goods" with the object
of "forcing or requiring any person to cease using . . . the
products of any other . . . manufacturer."'"' Yet the union ap-
peared to be engaging in just such an act in National Woodwork
Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB 2 when its members refused to
hang prefabricated doors at a construction site.'8 The union and
the employers were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
that provided that the union members would not be required to
handle prefitted doors. When the premachined doors arrived at
the jobsite, the employees refused to install them in accordance
with their contract.'1'
Relying more on the legislative history than on the language
of the statute itself, 85 Justice Brennan protected the union's
179. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250
(1970) (discussed infra notes 234-55 and accompanying text); NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498-99 (1960) ("Congress has been rather specific when it has
come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions").
180. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
181. Id. S 158(b)(4)(i)(B); see also id, 5 158(e) (forbidding an "agreement . . . whereby
[the] employer . . . agrees to cease or refrain from handling . . . any of the products of
any other employer").
182. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
183. Id. at 616.
184. Id. at 615-16.
185. Brennan explained:
It is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers." That principle has particular application in the
construction of labor legislation which is "to a marked degree, the result of
conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held
views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation
and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of
management and labor to further their respective interests:'
Id at 619 (citations omitted) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
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action as primary activity designed to preserve traditional bar-
gaining unit work. 86 The union's objective was directed at its
relationship with the employer. The potential of a secondary
impact-that is, the employer's refusal to buy products from the
manufacturer of prefabricated doors-did not concern Brennan
as long as the union's motive was primary and legitimate. 8 7
In the companion case of Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n
v. NLRB,8 8 Justice Brennan also protected as "primary" one
union's refusal to handle precut fittings when the cutting work
traditionally had been performed by a sister union whose mem-
bers worked for the same employer.18 9 Brennan rejected the
notion that a boycott could "become secondary because engaged
in by primary employees not directly affected by the dispute." 190
Because the employees of both unions worked for a single em-
ployer, Brennan found the boycott both legitimate and primary
with an object of influencing the employer "vis-a-vis his own
employees."' 91
Ten years later, in NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot
Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Machine & Gen-
eral Pipefitters, Local 638,192 Justice Brennan parted ways with
the Court majority, seeking again to limit the scope of S 8(b)(4)(B)
and maximize the use of economic weapons. The facts looked
much like those in National Woodwork Manufacturers. The col-
lective-bargaining agreement between the union and the subcon-
tractor employer required that union members perform pipe
threading and cutting at the jobsite.193 The contract between the
subcontractor and the general contractor, however, specified that
the general contractor would purchase climate control units with
precut and prethreaded piping.194 When the subcontractor em-
ployees refused to install the units, the general contractor filed
an unfair labor practice charge under § 8(b)(4)(B).1 95
The majority of the Court concluded the union's action was
unlawful because the employer, the subcontractor, had no control
over the disputed work once it was specified by contract with
186. Id. at 646.
187. Id.
188. 386 U.S. 664 (1967).
189. Id. at 669.
190. Id.
191. National Woodwork Mfrs., 386 U.S. at 645 (emphasis omitted); see Houston Insu-
lation Contractors, 386 U.S. at 668.
192. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
193. Id. at 512.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 512-13.
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the general contractor. 196 Because the general contractor deter-
mined the work "assignment," the general contractor-the "sec-
ondary" employer-was the unlawful target of the union's
conduct. 197 Justice Brennan disagreed, arguing that National
Woodwork Manufacturers controlled. 98 The point of the union's
boycott, he reasoned, was to enforce the collective-bargaining
agreement lawfully made with the subcontractor. The fact that
the subcontractor entered into a later contract with the general
contractor and thereby created an inconsistent obligation was of
no concern to the union or the Act. 9 9 The union therefore used
economic pressure to preserve bargaining unit work-a "pri-
mary" goal by definition, according to Justice Brennan.210 He
concluded that Congress left the underlying issue of resolving
problems created by technological change to negotiation between
labor and management.20'
Justice Brennan also addressed the scope of § 8(b)(4) in two
significant cases involving "consumer" picketing, again interpret-
ing the "spirit" of the statute to permit union conduct that might
otherwise appear proscribed by the literal language of the pro-
vision. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act prohibits a union from
threatening, coercing, or restraining a person with the object of
"forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer. . . or to cease doing business with any other person. '20 2
A proviso to the statute, however, permits "publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public ...
that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by another employer" unless the publicity interferes
with deliveries or the distributor's employees.20 3
In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local
760 (Tree Fruits)204 the union struck fruit packers and warehouse-
men in Yakima, Washington.20 5 In support of the strike, union
196. Id. at 529-31.
197. See id at 521-28, 528 n.16 ("[Tihe union sought to acquire work that it never had
and that its employer had no power to give it .
198. Id. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 538-40.
200. Id. at 535.
201. Id. at 543.
202. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1988).
203. Id. S 158(b)(4}{ii)(D).
204. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
205. Id. at 59.
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members picketed forty-six supermarkets in Seattle that sold the
employers' apples. The placards carried and handbills distributed
urged customers not to buy Washington State apples.20 6 The
pickets limited their activity to consumer entrances and no dis-
ruption of the supermarket employees' work or deliveries oc-
curred.207 The Board found the picketing illegal, relying both on
the literal language of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the negative implication
of the proviso's language "other than picketing."
28
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan cautioned against any
prohibition on peaceful picketing absent a clear congressional
mandate. In a now familiar pattern, he then canvassed the leg-
islative history of the Act to distill the statute's true "spirit."209
His search of the Senate debates convinced him that the Board
had read too much into the proviso's language: "The proviso
indicates no more than that the Senate conferees' constitutional
doubts led Congress to authorize publicity other than picketing
which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop
all trading with him."210 Picketing for such a purpose, however,
was barred as "secondary. '211
In contrast, the picketing in Tree Fruits was limited to an
appeal not to buy a single struck product. So limited, Brennan
concluded, the picketing was "closely confined to the primary
dispute. '212 As in National Woodwork Manufacturers, he appeared
unconcerned about some secondary impact if the activity could
be characterized fairly as "primary. '213 If intended as primary,
the economic weapon could be preserved and protected.
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),214
the majority of the Court, over Justice Brennan's objection,
206. Id. at 60.
207. Id. at 61.
208. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311,
314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1962), vacated, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). The circuit court had set aside the
Board's holding, ruling that affirmative proof was necessary to show that substantial
economic impact had occurred, or was likely to occur, due to the union's conduct. Id. at
317-18.
209. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63-71.
210. Id. at 70.
211. Id. at 70-71.
212. Id. at 72.
213. Id.; see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626-27 (1967)
(discussing the congressional intent behind the Act and stating that "however severe the
impact of primary activity on neutral employers, it was not thereby transformed into
activity with a secondary objective").
214. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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concluded that the Tree Fruits principle had its limits. 215 In Safeco,
the secondary employers picketed obtained over ninety percent
of their revenues from the sale of the primary product, Safeco
title insurance.216 The Court was unwilling to apply Tree Fruits
when the picketing "reasonably [could] be expected to threaten
neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss. '217 Such picketing,
the Court reasoned, would place the neutral secondary employer
in the untenable position of choosing between its own survival
and its relationship with the primary employer.218 The picketing
therefore constituted unlawful coercion under § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 219
Focusing again on the primary object of the union's actions,
Justice Brennan would have protected the picketing in Safeco
under the Tree Fruits holding. He found no difficulty in subjecting
the secondary employer to the risk of economic loss to the extent
that the employer had "entwine[d] its economic fate with that of
the primary employer by carrying the latter's goods." 22 The
Court's new test, Justice Brennan argued, would be difficult to
apply because the threat of ruin from a product boycott might
depend as much on the financial health of the secondary employer
as on the percentage of business derived from the boycotted
product.221 In keeping with the themes developed in National
Woodwork Manufacturers and Tree Fruits, he firmly adhered to
his views protecting a union's primary activities irrespective of
its impact on those "neutrals" who aligned themselves with the
primary employer.2
The decision in NLRB v. Servette, Inc.,2 issued the same day
as the Tree Fruits opinion, considered another issue under the
publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4). This time only handbilling was
involved,2 4 and the protection of the proviso seemed more ap-
parent. The union's initial strategy, however, was to ask super-
market managers not to buy products that the struck employer
distributed.2 The employer's charges raised two issues. First,
Justice Brennan determined that the store manager was an
215. Id. at 612-14.
216. Id. at 609.
217. Id. at 614.
218. Id. at 614-15.
219. Id. at 615.
220. Id. at 621 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 622.
222. Id. at 623-24.
223. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
224. Id. at 47-48.
225. Id.
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"individual" within the protection of 5 8(b)(4)(i).226 Nonetheless, he
found the union's actions permissible.m Reviewing the purpose
of S 8(b)(4) and the 1959 amendments, 2? Brennan concluded that
the union was not asking the managers to cease performing their
duties, as proscribed by 5 8(b)(4)(i); rather, the union was asking
them to make a managerial decision within their discretion.M
Section 8(b)(4) therefore was inapplicable.m
Protecting the union's handbilling in Servette provided Justice
Brennan with another statutory interpretation challenge. The
difficulty was the publicity proviso language in § 8(b)(4) protecting
publicity about products "produced" by the primary employer.2 1
The employer in Servette was a distributor, not a producer, of
goods.2 2 Pointing to "a profound Senate concern that the unions'
freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be
adequately safeguarded," Brennan found the "spirit" of the pro-
viso sufficiently broad to encompass a distributor.m Again, acting
consistently with his goal of maximizing the availability of eco-
nomic weapons, Justice Brennan found the necessary support to
construe narrowly any restrictions on their use and to interpret
broadly the Act's protections.
5. Private Dispute Resolution
Perhaps the case best illustrating Justice Brennan's quest for
the "spirit" of the labor laws-sometimes at the expense of the
statutory language-and the protection of the parties' private
relationship is Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770.2 In Boys Markets, the Court reconsidered the case of Sin-
clair Refining Co. v. Atkinson s5 decided eight years earlier.
226. Id. at 49-50; see 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4}(i) (1988) (prohibiting a union from seeking "to
induce or encourage any individual employed by any person . . . to engage in . . . a
refusal in the course of his employment to . . . handle . . . commodities or to perform
any services" with an unlawful secondary objective as defined in subparagraphs (A), (B),
(C), or (D)).
227. Servette, 377 U.S. at 50-51.
228. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 55 201(e),
704(a)-(c), 705(a), 73 Stat. 519, 525, 542-45 (1959).
229. Servette, 377 U.S. at 50-51.
230. Id. at 49-54.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
232. Servette, 377 U.S. at 47.
233. Id. at 55.
234. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
235. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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The issue Sinclair presented concerned the relationship be-
tween the injunction prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act2
and the grievance-arbitration provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement.23 The union and employer had agreed to submit to
binding arbitration any dispute concerning working conditions.M
The collective-bargaining agreement also provided that the union
would not strike over any issue that could be the subject of a
grievance.P9 Nonetheless, the union called a series of work stop-
pages to protest a grievance that had already been submitted to
arbitration.20 The employer sought to enjoin any future strikes.21
The Norris-LaGuardia Act states in broad language:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment. 42
Section 13 of the Act defines the term "labor dispute" as including
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment."' 43 To avoid the conclusion that Norris-LaGuardia prohib-
ited the injunction requested by the employer in Sinclair is
difficult, and, indeed, the majority of the Court so found. 4 Based
on the legislative history of the Act, as well as prior Supreme
Court interpretations, the Court noted that Norris-LaGuardia
"was deliberately drafted in the broadest of terms in order to
avoid the danger that it would be narrowed by judicial construc-
tion."?5 Writing for the majority, Justice Black rejected Sinclair's
argument that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 246
partially repealed Norris-LaGuardia. 247 Reviewing the legislative
history of § 301, he stated:
236. 29 U.S.C. SS 101-115 (1988).
237. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 196-99.
238. Id. at 197.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 29 U.S.C. S 104(a) (1988).
243. 1&. § 113(e).
244. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 209-15.
245. I& at 203.
246. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 301(a), 29 U.S.C. S 185(a) (1988).
247. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 203-15.
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The unequivocal statements in the House Conference Report
and by Senator Taft on the floor of the Senate could only have
been accepted by the Congressmen and Senators who read or
heard them as assurances that they could vote in favor of § 301
without altering, reducing or impairing in any manner the anti-
injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.248
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the two statutes must
be accommodated to "give the fullest possible effect to the central
purposes of both."249 Norris-LaGuardia's concern about judicial
interference with the union's primary economic weapon would be
substantially diluted if replaced with the protection of a volun-
tarily assumed duty to arbitrate.2 Conversely, the NLRA's goal
of promoting industrial peace through grievance arbitration would
be dealt a "crippling blow" if the employer were unable to enforce
the duty to arbitrate by enjoining a strike in breach of that
duty.25'
Eight years later in Boys Markets, the Court expressly over-'
ruled Sinclair, and thereby vindicated Justice Brennan's views. 252
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan rejected Sinclair as
"a significant departure from our otherwise consistent emphasis
upon the congressional policy to promote the peaceful settlement
of labor disputes through arbitration."'' Restating many of the
themes discussed in his Sinclair dissent, Brennan discussed the
necessity of accommodating statutory policies beyond a "concen-
tration upon isolated words." He again concluded that little of
248. Id. at 209. Justice Black based his conclusion on the language in H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, and on
statements Senator Taft made during the debates on the Act, see, e.g., 93 CONG. REC.
6441, 6443, 6445-46 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft) (expressing his belief that the Senate's
adoption of the House provision, in conference, rejected any repeal of Norris-LaGuardia
and left untouched all injunction provisions).
249. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 216 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. Cf. id. at 218 ("It cannot be denied that the availability of the injunctive remedy
in this setting is far more necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of S 301 than
it would be detrimental to those of Norris-LaGuardia.").
251. Id. at 227.
252. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 238 (1970). In
the intervening years, the consequences of Sinclair had been aggravated by the Court's
decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), which permitted state court actions under S 301
to be removed to federal court. Id. at 560. Thus, although Norris-LaGuardia did not cover
state courts, the practical effect of Avco was to remove the availability of injunctive
relief from state courts as well. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 244-47.
253. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 241 (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 250.
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Norris-LaGuardia would be sacrificed by the countervailing and
"overriding interest in the successful implementation of the ar-
bitration process." 5
On one level, Justice Brennan's positions in Sinclair and Boys
Markets signaled a departure from the recurrent theme of pro-
tecting the parties' economic weapons. The effect of Boys Markets
was to remove the union's most powerful weapon, the right to
strike. His opinions suggested that promoting and preserving the
duty to resolve disputes through arbitration trumps the freedom
of economic weapons. A broader perspective, however, may rec-
oncile both goals. By enforcing the union's voluntarily assumed
ban on striking, Justice Brennan, in fact, was, protecting the free
play of the "market" relationship. Because the right to strike is
considered the union's most important weapon, one reasonably
can assume that the union forfeited that right only in exchange
for significant concessions by the employer. Having struck a
bargain, the benefit of that bargain to the employer can be
realized only through specific enforcement of the contract. If
Justice Brennan was correct that damages are an ineffective
remedy,2 then the union is never required to "pay up" unless
strikes can be enjoined. To say that arbitration is more important
than the right to strike is misleading. The right to strike is
protected by the NLRA, whereas the duty to arbitrate is vol-
untarily assumed through collective bargaining.257 The agreement
of the parties is therefore the key, encompassing both the duty
to arbitrate and a waiver of the statutory right to strike.
A comparison of Boys Markets with Justice Brennan's dissent
in Chicago & North Western Railway v. United Transportation
Unioni highlights this point. As discussed previously, Brennan
255. Id. at 252; see also William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S.
12, 15-18 (1974) (upholding state court's authority to enjoin breach of a no-strike clause
even though breach arguably was also an unfair labor practice); International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prohibit
an injunction to enforce an arbitration award).
256. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248 (asserting that damages "would only tend to
aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between
employer and union").
257. Justice Brennan's protection of arbitration receives additional support from S 203(d)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which provides: "Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement" 29 U.S.C. S 173(d) (1988).
258. 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
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opposed a strike injunction under the Railway Labor Act 2 9 in
Chicago & North Western Railway as a means to enforce the
union's bargaining obligations under § 2, First.211 In that case, he
argued that the Court's interference with economic weapons
would hinder "voluntary settlement" otherwise encouraged by
the threat and use of those weapons.2 1 In Boys Markets, by
contrast, he granted the injunction to enforce the union's "vol-
untary settlement"-a contractual agreement not to strike. 262
Furthermore, enforcing the duty to arbitrate in conjunction
with a Boys Markets injunction reinforces Justice Brennan's par-
allel goal of limiting judicial interference.213 Rather than submit-
ting their contract disputes to the courts, the parties have
developed their own procedure for resolving problems of inter-
pretation. The union and the employer thus not only control the
substantive provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement but
also largely control the method of interpretation and enforce-
ment.
26 4
6. The Scope of the NLRA
To maximize the use and effect of the parties' economic power
as the means for achieving industrial peace, Justice Brennan's
philosophy suggested a broad scope for the NLRA. The inclusion
of most employees and most issues in the bargaining relationship
ensured a more comprehensive and integrated role for the NLRA-
required structure. The more inclusive the Act, the more signif-
icant the impact of the parties' economic strength.
259. 45 U.S.C. 55 151-188 (1988).
260. Id. S 152, First; see supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (outlining Justice
Brennan's reasoning in opposing the majority's use of an injunction).
261. Chicago & North W. Ry., 402 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970).
263. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
264. Justice Brennan emphasized the importance of encouraging private dispute reso-
lution in his concurring opinion in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,
475 U.S. 643, 652-56 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). Although a court must resolve the
issue of arbitrability under a collective-bargaining agreement before compelling the parties
to arbitrate, he noted that "' [d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.'" Id. at
653 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583
(1960)). When the contract contains a "'standard arbitration clause, providing for arbitra-
tion of "any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract,"' " a
court must require arbitration absent explicit exclusionary language in the contract or a
definitive bargaining history of intent to exclude. Id. at 652, 654-55 (quoting Communi-
cations Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d 203, 206 (1984) (quoting Article 8 of the
collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the employer)), vacated, 475 U.S.
643 (1986).
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Justice Brennan dissented in two well-known decisions that
considered the Act's applicability to school faculties. The first,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,265 raised First Amendment problems
because the employer was a religious institution. The second,
NLRB v. Yeshiva University,266 addressed the question of whether
university faculty could be excluded as "managerial" employees.
In Catholic Bishop, the Court excluded from NLRA coverage
lay faculty of church-operated schools teaching both religious and
secular subjects.27 The Court was wary of the potential conflict
with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and chose not
to decide the issue absent evidence of an affirmative intent of
Congress to include these employees within the Act's scope. 268 In
dissent Justice Brennan pointed to Congress' rejection of such
an exclusion when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act.269 The Senate
also rejected an analogous amendment to exempt church-operated
hospitals in the proposed 1974 amendments. °0 The Court's ruling,
Brennan argued, contradicted both the statutory intent and the
Court's own precedents to give the NLRA the broadest jurisdic-
tion possible.21 Brennan asserted: "As long as an employer is
within the reach of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause-
and no one doubts that respondents are-the Court has held him
to be covered by the Act regardless of the nature of his activ-
ity."22
In Yeshiva University, Justice Brennan failed again to convince
a majority of the Court to broaden the Act's horizons. Reversing
the Board's determination,." 3 the Court characterized Yeshiva
University's full-time faculty as "managerial" employees and thus
excluded them from the NLRA's protection2 4 Justice Brennan
265. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
266. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
267. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504-07.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 512-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that, instead, the ultimate Senate
proposal included a single exception for nonprofit hospitals); see H.R. 3020, S 2(2), 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
270. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 513-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see 120 CONG. REC.
12,967-68 (1974) (rejecting Sen. Ervin's proposed amendment to exclude church-supported
hospitals from the NLRA's jurisdiction).
271. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
273. Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977), enforcement denied, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1978), and affd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). The Board earlier found the faculty to be employees
within the meaning of the Act and directed an election in a bargaining unit comprised
of all full-time faculty. See Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975).
274. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 688-91.
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analogized the Board-created exclusion for "managerial" employ-
ees to the statutory exclusion of supervisors.2 5 The key, he
argued, is alliance with management and the potential for con-
flicting loyalties.27 Brennan contended that the majority misper-
ceived the role of a faculty in university decisionmaking in a
modern university setting.277 By excluding the Act's protection,
he claimed, the Court fueled the fires of labor unrest:
By its overbroad and unwarranted interpretation of the man-
agerial exclusion, the Court denies the faculty the protections
of the NLRA and, in so doing, removes whatever deterrent
value the Act's availability may offer against unreasonable
administrative conduct. Rather than promoting the Act's ob-
jective of funneling dissension between employers and employ-
ees into collective bargaining, the Court's decision undermines
that goal and contributes to the possibility that "recurring
disputes [will] fester outside the negotiation process until strikes
or other forms of economic warfare occur."' 8
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.29
involved the related problem of "confidential" employees. The
Board traditionally has excluded from bargaining units employees
with access to confidential labor relations information.28 The
employers in two separate cases argued, and the Seventh Circuit
agreed, that the exclusion should extend to all confidential em-
ployees, not just those with access to labor relations informa-
275. Id. at 692; see 29 U.S.C. S 152(11) (1988).
276. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 693.
277. Id. at 696-705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 705 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 499
(1979) (alteration in original)).
279. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
280. B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956), set the standard by "limit[ing] the
term 'confidential' so as to embrace only those employees who assist and act in a
confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies in the field of labor relations." See, e.g., Los Angeles New Hosp., 244 N.L.R.B.
960, 961 (1979) (stating that "mere access" to confidential labor relations material and
typing of confidential memoranda "does not, without more, imply confidential status"),
enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hosp., 640 F.2d (9th Cir 1981); Weyerhaeuser
Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1172-73 (1968) (distinguishing between secretaries who work for
top management officials and those who work for junior officers who do not "formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies"); Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 160
N.L.R.B. 1504, 1508-09 (1966) (stating that the B.F. Goodrich considerations "are to be
assessed in the conjunctive" and that an employee is not a confidential employee "merely
by virtue of being a secretary to a person involved in the handling of grievances").
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tion.2' Justice Brennan, this time mustering majority support,
upheld the Board's "labor-nexus" standard.2 2 Emphasizing the
Act's expansive definition of "employee" as including "any em-
ployee," he found the Board's approach consistent with the leg-
islative history and policy to avoid "depriving all employees who
have access to confidential business information from the full
panoply of rights afforded by the Act."
Justice Brennan's views on the duty to bargain further illus-
trate his concern with the scope of the Act. In First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,2 the Court permitted an employer
to shut down part of its business without bargaining with the
union, absent proof that "the benefit, for labor-management re-
lations and the collective-bargaining process, outweigh[ed] the
burden placed on the conduct of the business."28 In most cases,
the Court speculated, the need for "speed, flexibility, and secrecy"
would outweigh the unlikely possibility that bargaining with the
union could alter the employer's decision. 2 8 Justice Brennan, by
contrast, agreed with the circuit court that the presumption
should be in favor of bargaining:
I cannot agree with ... [the majority's] test, because it takes
into account only the interests of management; it fails to
281. See Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 766, 769-
70 (7th Cir. 1980) (refusing enforcement of NLRB finding that secretary was not in a
confidential capacity, alleging Board in actuality applied the labor nexus standard), rev'd,
454 U.S. 170 (1981); Malleable Iron Range Co. v. NLRB, No. 79-1991 (7th Cir. July 21,
1980) (denying enforcement of bargaining order with regard to 18 employees, alleging
that the Regional Director of the NLRB used the labor nexus standard in finding the
employees were not in confidential positions), rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Hendricks County
Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
282. Hendricks County, 454 U.S. at 190.
283. Id. at 189. Justice Brennan's desire to broaden the scope of the Act was, of course,
not boundless. See NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District, 402 U.S. 600, 609 (1971), in
which Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, upheld the Board's exclusion of a utility
district from the NLRA's coverage as a "political subdivision" under § 2(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 152(2) (1988). The facts established that the individuals
who were administering the district were directly responsible to public officials. Natural
Gas, 402 U.S. at 608. See also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 169-71 (1971), in which Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, excluded retirees from the definition of "employee" under 5 2(3) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. S 152(3).
284. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
285. Id. at 679.
286. Id. at 682-83. See generally B. Glenn George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A
New Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667, 678-80 (1985) (describing
in detail the Court's formulation of the balancing test as essentially a per se rule of not
requiring bargaining).
1992] 1161
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1123
consider the legitimate employment interests of the workers
and their union. This one-sided approach hardly serves "to
foster in a neutral manner" a system for resolution of these
serious, two-sided controversies.2
Similarly, in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,m Justice Brennan
would not have permitted the exigencies of bankruptcy to over-
come the employer's duty to bargain prior to altering employment
terms.289 Although he agreed with the Court majority that the
Bankruptcy CodeP° subjects a collective-bargaining agreement to
rejection,2 1 Brennan challenged the holding that unilateral changes
in contract terms do not constitute an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA.2 2 Echoing his approach to the statutory conflict
presented in Sinclair Refining Co. v. AtkinsonP3 and Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,24 he argued that it
was the Court's "duty" to resolve the conflict "in a way that
accommodates the policies of both federal statutes."' ' 5 Justice
Brennan contended that the requirements of 5 8(d) of the NLRA2 6
were necessary to prevent the "'economic warfare' resulting
from unilateral changes." Collective bargaining would channel
labor-management conflict, as the NLRA intended, thereby re-
ducing the possibility of labor unrest that might interfere with
287. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting the majority, id. at 680-81); see also Department of the Treasury v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 934-37 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. S§ 7101-7135 (1988),
requires the IRS to bargain over a union proposal to designate the contract's grievance-
arbitration provisions as the "internal appeals" procedure that OMB regulations require).
288. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
289. Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290. See 11 U.S.C. S 365(a) (1988) ("ITihe trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.").
291. See Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 521-27 (discussing the policies of the NLRA
relative to the Bankruptcy Code).
292. Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority's
holding subsequently was modified by 11 U.S.C. S 113 (1988), which requires a court
hearing and ruling on application prior to unilateral rejection of a collective-bargaining
agreement.
293. 370 U.S. 195, 216 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 234-51 and
accompanying text).
294. 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (discussed supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text).
295. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 541 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); accord Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA must be accommodated to
"give the fullest possible effect to the central purposes of both").
296. 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1988).
297. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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the chances for a successful reorganization under the Bankruptcy
Code.2 8
B. "The Safeguarding of Rights of Dissent"
Justice Brennan has been described as a prominent advocate
of individual rights in the labor law arena, just as he acquired
such a label in constitutional law. 00 One need not view this
advocacy, however, as a contradiction of Justice Brennan's focus
on economic freedom and judicial restraint as means of achieving
peaceful voluntary settlements. Rather, individual rights fit well
within his broader framework of protecting the process of collec-
tive bargaining, thus freeing the parties to utilize more fully the
economic weapons at their disposal. The problem becomes main-
taining the union-employee alliance so that the collective power
remains undiluted.
Justice Brennan's "individual rights" cases under the NLRA
and the RLA fall into two general categories. The first group of
cases pits the individual against the union, involving issues such
as objections to the use of union funds and election practices for
union office. Brennan routinely sided with the individual in these
decisions to protect the representation paradigm of collective
bargaining. He required qualifications for union office to comply
with the "spirit" of democracy embodied in the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).30 1 Further, he
restricted the use of union dues to collective-bargaining expenses.
Brennan, however, rejected more intrusive regulation of union
affairs, such as the imposition and collection of fines. The second
category of cases finds the lone employee at odds with her
employer. Here, Justice Brennan stepped in to ensure that the
individual remained connected to her source of economic power,
the union. Whether facing a disciplinary interview or asserting
a right guaranteed by the collective-bargaining agreement, the
employee retained the protection of "concerted" activity.
298. Id. at 548-51. In Local 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358
U.S. 283, 293-95 (1959), Justice Brennan characterized as a mandatory subject of bargaining
the rental rate for drivers who drove their own trucks for the employer. That because
of past abuse in which owner-drivers were paid below cost rental rates, providing rental
rates in the collective-bargaining agreement protected the owner-drivers' wage rates. Id.
299. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 765 (1961).
300. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
301. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C. (1988)).
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1. The Individual vs. the Union
a. The Use of Union Dues
When presented with the dilemmas of individual employees,
especially those who found themselves in dispute with the union,
Justice Brennan seemed more willing than in other areas to
scrutinize the parties' relationship. In particular, Brennan was
responsible for an important series of decisions addressing the
use of union dues. The issue first arose under § 2, Eleventh of
the Railway Labor Act 30 2 in International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street.03 Union members challenged the use of mandatory fees
and dues for political campaigns to which they objected.3 0 4 Avoid-
ing the constitutional grounds upon which the state court relied,
Brennan interpreted S 2, Eleventh to prohibit such uses of union
fees:
[Such] use to support candidates for public office, and advance
political programs, is not a use which helps defray the expenses
of the negotiation or administration of collective agreements,
or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and
disputes. In other words, it is a use which falls clearly outside
the reasons advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress
why authority to make union-shop agreements was justified.2 5
The decision in Street strikes an interesting, if subtle, compro-
mise. The union was not restricted to collecting dues limited to
each member's proportionate share of the collective-bargaining
costs, as one might suspect from some of the Court's language30 6
Rather, the Court required the union to return the portion of a
member's fees used for political purposes only if and when that
member "affirmatively" notified the union of her dissent.3 7 Street
302. 45 U.S.C. S 152, Eleventh (1988) (authorizing agreements that require all employees
to join the labor organization and pay dues as a condition of continued employment).
303. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
304. Id. at 744.
305. Id. at 768.
306. After reflecting that such political expenditures are beyond the realm of intended
purposes, id., the Court explained that unions are not estopped from pursuing "non-
intended" interests as long as they do not spend monies specifically exacted from
dissenting employees on these aims, id. at 770.
307. Id. at 774. In Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972),
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court construing 18 U.S.C. S 610 (1988),
which prohibits unions from contributing to federal election campaigns. The Court inter-
preted the statute not to apply to contributions from union political funds supported by
voluntary contributions. Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 401.
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was a victory for the individual, but a qualified one. The union
member still had the burden of tracking the union's expenditures
in order to object to political contributions she considered unac-
ceptable. Justice Brennan alleviated part of this burden two years
later in Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen308 by
making it clear that the union, possessing all the relevant infor-
mation, would be responsible for proving the proportion of polit-
ical expenditures.0 °9
The decision in Communications Workers v. Beck 10 addressed
parallel issues under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.311 The employees in
Beck chose not to become union members but were required to
pay "agency fees" equivalent to union dues.3 2 Beck raised a
broader question than Street because the Beck employees were
objecting to all expenditures of fees unrelated to collective bar-
gaining, not just political contributions. 313 Justice Brennan found
Street controlling because the two relevant provisions of the RLA
and the NLRA were "in all material respects identical." 314 Al-
though both provisions permitted a union and employer to require
all employees to join the union, Justice Brennan stated that such
"compulsory unionism" was authorized "only to the extent nec-
essary to ensure that those who enjoy union-negotiated benefits
contribute to their cost."315
When confronted with a direct conflict between a union and
the employees it represented, Justice Brennan's sentiments ap-
peared to lie with the individual. 31 6 This tendency seems some-
308. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
309. Id. at 122.
310. 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988) (rejecting arguments that the union security provisions of
the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA should be read differently).
311. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). This section provides in pertinent part:
[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-
membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if
he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership.
312. Beck, 487 U.S. at 739-40.
313. Id. at 745.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 746. For the Court's most recent treatment of the use of union fees, see
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1959 (1991) (holding union fees may
subsidize lobbying only if the lobbying relates to "the ratification or implementation of
a dissenter's collective-bargaining agreement").
316. Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (upholding award of attorneys' fees to
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what at odds with-or at least unconnected to-my proposed
vision which arguably links many of his other writings. 17 Several
explanations are possible. Perhaps in this area, when an employee
dissents from the group, Brennan's well-established concern for
individual rights simply overrode his interest in protecting the
power of the group. The issue was particularly highlighted in
Beck, in which the plaintiffs had chosen not to become union
members but were nonetheless required to pay agency fees for
the union's representative services. Perhaps Brennan would ar-
gue, analogous to his dissent in Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA)
v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 18 that the use of
fees for union expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining is
"inherently destructive" of the trust created by the privilege of
exclusive representation.3 19 On the other hand, a restriction on
the use of union fees arguably may support a broader goal of
union solidarity. Even employees who otherwise support union
representation may object to certain expenditures unrelated to
collective bargaining, such as contributions to a political candidate
whom that employee opposes. Internal disputes about such issues
might fragment the unit on topics peripheral to the union's
central role as bargaining representative. Permitting the em-
ployee to limit the use of her fees thus would serve to strengthen
the union's power by eliminating unnecessary internal conflicts.
b. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and
the Employee-Union Relationship
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA)20 provided Justice Brennan with a significant weapon
to protect the employee from being overpowered by a union
representative. Passed in 1959, the statute added protections for
the individual union member to ensure "democratic" access to
union elections and decisionmaking. 21 Nonetheless, Brennan con-
tinued to temper that protection by restricting the role of the
courts in supervising the union's internal affairs.
plaintiff who successfully sued union for reinstatement); Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359
U.S. 326, 337-38 (1959) (holding that a union interfered with statutory right to revoke
dues checkoff authorization by requiring that revocation be made only on a union-provided
form).
317. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
318. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
319. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
320. 29 U.S.C. S 401-531 (1988).
321. See id. § 481-483.
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In Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 632
and Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery,32 Justice Brennan
invalidated unreasonable restrictions on eligibility for union office
under § 401(e) of the LMRDA. 24 In Wirtz, the union bylaws
permitted only those members who had previously held elective
office to run as candidates for "major" elective offices.3 2 In Usery,
only those union members who had attended at least half of all
union meetings during the prior three years were eligible to run
for union office. 26 The Wirtz rule eliminated ninety-three percent
of the membership from eligibility;32 the Usery rule eliminated
ninety-six and one-half percent.28 In both cases, Brennan found
such wholesale disqualification of most of the electorate in direct
conflict with the LMRDA's goal of insuring "free and democratic
elections." 329
In Wirtz, Justice Brennan addressed the problem of ensuring
free elections while minimizing interference into internal union
affairs:
The legislative history shows that Congress weighed how best
to legislate against revealed abuses in union elections without
departing needlessly from its long-standing policy against un-
necessary governmental intrusion into internal union affairs.
The Court of Appeals, however, in considering the reasonable-
ness of the bylaw, emphasized only the congressional concern
not to intervene unnecessarily in internal union affairs ....
But this emphasis overlooks the fact that the congressional
concern to avoid unnecessary intervention was balanced against
the policy expressed in the Act to protect the public interest
by assuring that union elections would be conducted in accor-
dance with democratic principles. 30
Justice Brennan's description of the congressional scheme of
the LMRDA generally parallels his vision of the NLRA. The
322. 391 U.S. 492, 508-09 (1968).
323. 429 U.S. 305, 308-10 (1977).
324. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) ("In any election required by this section which is to be held
by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates
and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office
(subject to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) .
325. Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 493-94.
326. Usery, 429 U.S. at 306-07.
327. Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 508.
328. Usery, 429 U.S. at 310.
329. Id. at 309-10; Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 496-97.
330. Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 496 (citations omitted).
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statute that outlined creation of the union-member relationship
and the procedures governing that relationship left the substan-
tive results of that "marriage" to the parties themselves. Justice
Brennan explained: "Congress did not saddle the courts with the
duty to search out and remove improperly entrenched union
leaderships. Rather, Congress chose to guarantee union democ-
racy by regulating not the results of a union's electoral procedure
but the procedure itself."' 1
In contrast to the limited intrusion into union affairs permitted
under the LMRDA, Justice Brennan refused to allow any inter-
ference under 5 8(b) of the NLRA33 2 with a union's decision to
fine its members for crossing a picket line. In NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the union fined several of its
members for crossing the picket line and later obtained a state
court judgment against one employee for the unpaid fines.3m The
employer filed charges under S 8(b)(1)(A). 35 Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan found nothing improper in the union's enforce-
ment of its "contract" with its member. He emphasized the same
substance-procedure distinction implicit in Wirtz and Usery:
The [LMRDA's] requirements of adherence to democratic prin-
ciples, fair procedures and freedom of speech apply to the
election of union officials and extend into all aspects of union
affairs. In the present case the procedures followed for calling
the strikes and disciplining the recalcitrant members fully
comported with these requirements, and were in every way
fair and democratic. 336
Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v.
Hardeman,37 Justice Brennan distinguished between an employ-
ee's objection to the union's expulsion procedure and the union's
justification for the expulsion.m He explained that although the
LMRDA requires written notice of specific charges, "it gives
courts no warrant to scrutinize the union regulations in order to
determine whether particular conduct may be punished at all."'' 9
331. Usery, 429 U.S. at 311-12.
332. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1988).
333. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
334. Id. at 176-77.
335. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
336. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195 (footnote omitted).
337. 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
338. See id. at 244-45.
339. Id. at 245.
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Even with the procedural scrutiny authorized by the LMRDA,
Justice Brennan carefully restricted judicial interference. In Dun-
lop v. Bachowski,3 40 for example, he examined the reviewability
of a decision by the Secretary of Labor not to initiate an action
to set aside a union election. The plaintiff, a defeated candidate
in a union election, filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
alleging violations of § 401 of the LMRDA. 1 The Secretary
investigated the charges and concluded that an action to invali-
date the election was "not warranted."' 2 Writing for the Court,
Brennan agreed that the Secretary's decision was a reviewable
agency action but also held that the scope of review was nar-
row.43 The Court required the Secretary to provide a statement
of reasons for his decision but limited judicial review to an
examination of the statement produced:
The necessity that the reviewing court refrain from substitu-
tion of its judgment for that of the Secretary thus helps define
the permissible scope of review. Except in what must be the
rare case, the court's review should be confined to examination
of the "reasons" statement, and the determination whether the
statement, without more, evinces that the Secretary's decision
is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and
capricious.34
Justice Brennan again admonished the courts against extensive
interference in union elections in Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano
Moving v. Crowley.35 In that case, several union members objected
to the barring of some members from the nominations meeting
and the failure to recognize one of the plaintiffs as a candidate
340. 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975).
341. Id. at 562; see 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1988).
342. Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 563.
343. Id. at 571-74.
344. Id. at 572-73. Justice Brennan, however, did not believe the role of the Secretary
of Labor should be too circumscribed. In Hodgson v. Local Union 6799, United Steel-
workers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971), the majority of the Court concluded that the Secretary of
Labor was barred from challenging an election violation under the LMRDA when the
complaining member had failed to raise the objection during the internal union review
process. Id. at 341. Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the Court had overvalued
the Act's exhaustion requirement. Justice Brennan believed that the Secretary should be
free to pursue any violations uncovered during his investigation in order to further the
goal of ensuring free elections. See id. at 341-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
thus continued to seek a balance between protection of union members on the one hand
and limiting external interference on the other hand. He apparently found administrative
intervention somewhat more palatable than judicial intervention.
345. 467 U.S. 526, 550-51 (1984).
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for secretary-treasurer.36 After the ballots were distributed, the
plaintiffs filed in federal district court and obtained a preliminary
injunction sealing the uncounted ballots and ordering a new
election supervised by court-appointed arbitrators.3 47 Justice
Brennan carefully reviewed the enforcement provisions of Title
I38 and Title IV349 of the LMRDA to determine the district court's
authority to intervene in a pending election.350 Although Title IV
clearly bars Title I relief for an individual after an election is
completed, Justice Brennan concluded that a Title I action may
be appropriate during an election.35' Nonetheless, a court-super-
vised election was beyond the scope of the courts' power. As
Justice Brennan explained, "'[A]ppropriate' relief under Title I"
did not encompass delaying the results of the original election
or interfering with the Secretary of Labor's "exclusive respon-
sibilities for supervising new elections."3 52
2. Individual and Collective Action
Two of Justice Brennan's better-known opinions addressed the
relative powerlessness of the individual in conflict with her
employer.53 In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Ine.,31 the employer
denied an employee's request for the presence of a union repre-
sentative during an investigatory interview exploring possible
misconduct.35 The employee charged that the denial violated her
rights under 5 7 of the NLRA "to engage in other concerted
activities for . ..mutual aid or protection,"3  and the Board
agreed.3 57
346. Id. at 529-30.
347. See Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 521 F. Supp. 614, 618-19
(D. Mass. 1981) (holding that when "union self-government" is "tainted" against democracy
judicial intervention is appropriate), affid, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), and rev'd, 467 U.S.
526 (1984).
348. 29 U.S.C. SS 411-415 (1988).
349. Id. S 481-483 (1988).
350. C'owleyj, 467 U.S. at 541-50.
351. Id. at 546-50.
352. Id. at 551.
353. NRLB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984); NRLB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
354. 420 U.S. 251.
355. Id. at 252.
356. 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1988). Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to violate S 7 rights. Id. § 158(a)(1).
357. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 450, enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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In spite of his caution in other decisions against relying on the
plain meaning of labor statutes 35 Justice Brennan found the
right of union representation "within the literal wording of S ' 59
The representative's presence acted as "aid or protection" to the
individual employee and also protected the interests of the entire
bargaining unit by monitoring the employer's disciplinary prac-
tices.6 0 The decision made much of the Board's expertise and
special "responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of
industrial life."36' 1 Although not necessarily required by the Act,
the Board's conclusion was a "permissible" balancing of inter-
ests. 6
2
Ten years later, the decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems,
Inc.3 repeated many of the themes of Weingarten. The employee
in City Disposal refused to drive a garbage truck he believed to
be unsafe and, consequently, was fired.e The collective-bargain-
ing agreement covering the employee provided that employees
would not be required to drive "any vehicle that [was] not in
safe operating condition" and that a refusal to operate "such
equipment" was not a violation of the contract, "unless such
refusal is unjustified."' ss
Justice Brennan upheld the Board's ruling that an employee's
assertion of a contract right constituted protected "concerted
activit[y]" under § 7.366 Reminiscent of his justification of the
Weingarten rule as protecting the rights of all bargaining unit
employees, Brennan found the employee's action to be "concerted
activity in a very real sense:"' ' 7
358. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968)
("We have cautioned against a literal reading of congressional labor legislation:'); National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967) ("'[A] thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intentions of its makers.' ") (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). But see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 518 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A statute is not a 'nose of wax to be changed from that which
the plain language imports.).. (quoting Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518
(1926)).
359. Weingarten 420 U.S. at 260.
360. Id. at 261.62.
361. I& at 266.
362. Id. at 266-67.
363. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
364. Id. at 824.
365. Id. at 824-25.
366. I& at 825.
367. Id. at 832.
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[W]hen an employee invokes a right grounded in the collective-
bargaining agreement, he does not stand alone. Instead, he
brings to bear on his employer the power and resolve of all
his fellow employees. When, for instance, James Brown refused
to drive a truck he believed to be unsafe, he was in effect
reminding his employer that he and his fellow employees, at
the time their collective-bargaining agreement was signed, had
extracted a promise from City Disposal that they would not
be asked to drive unsafe trucks. He was also reminding his
employer that if it persisted in ordering him to drive an unsafe
truck, he could reharness the power of that group to ensure
the enforcement of that promise. It was just as though James
Brown was reassembling his fellow union members to reenact
their decision not to drive unsafe trucks.36
As in Weingarten, Justice Brennan turned to the purposes of
the Act and concentrated on the equalization of bargaining power:
[I1t is evident that, in enacting S 7 of the NLRA, Congress
sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the em-
ployee with that of his employer by allowing employees to
band together in confronting an employer regarding the terms
and conditions of their employment. . . . [W]hat emerges from
the general background of § 7-and what is consistent with
the Act's statement of purpose-is a congressional intent to
create an equality in bargaining power between the employee
and the employer throughout the entire process of labor or-
ganizing, collective bargaining, and enforcement of collective-
bargaining agreements. 9
Justice Brennan's concern with the balance of power in Wein-
garten and City Disposal resurrected a vision of the NLRA from
one of his first labor opinions, NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local
Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen).3 70 His philosophy here appears in
conflict with other opinions that condemn the balancing of power
through regulation of economic weapons.37 ' One possible expla-
nation for the inconsistency is obvious: Justice Brennan was
willing to leave the parties to the fortune of their economic
strength when an employer was pitted against a union; when the
adversary was a lone employee, however, Justice Brennan may
have felt compelled to intervene.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 835.
370. 353 U.S. 87 (1957); see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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Such an explanation, although perhaps true, seems only partly
satisfactory. Rather than relegate the parties to their own de-
vices, the Board, with the Court's approval, has stepped in to
provide some specific protections for individual employees to
flesh out the general rights guaranteed by S 7. Where does this
fit in with Justice Brennan's recurring themes of economic free-
dom and limiting judicial involvement in the employer-union
association? The answer may be that the effect of both Weingar-
ten and City Disposal is to diminish the employee's isolation and
align her with the union-the "solidarity" theme explicitly artic-
ulated by Brennan some years later in his dissent in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. (TWA) v. Independent Federation of Flight Atten-
dants.372 Once tied to the union, however, the employee's own
power is confined by the union's relative strength. In Weingarten,
for example, the right of union representation promises no more
than the presence of a union agent when affirmatively requested
by the employee. 73 The union has no right to participate in the
interview or demand bargaining with the employer; the employer
is free to forego the interview entirely and proceed with her
investigation through other channels.37 4
The right of representation thus is a limited one and likely
proves only as effective as the union itself. When dealing with a
powerful union, an employer may be more likely to include a
union representative in an investigatory interview-with or with-
out the employee's request-to permit the representative to ask
questions, offer additional evidence, and bargain with the repre-
sentative concerning appropriate procedures or sanctions. A weak
union may be more likely to provide nothing more than a wit-
ness-the minimum that Weingarten requires. As with collective
bargaining, Justice Brennan's focus was on process, not sub-
stance. The opinion in Weingarten made no effort to regulate
appropriate discipline for specified offenses; it merely ensured
372. 489 U.S. 426 (1989); see supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
373. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975).
374. See, e.g., id. at 257-59 (stating "the employer is free to carry on his inquiry without
interviewing the employee"). Failing to interview the employee, however, may impact a
future arbitration of the discharge decision. In considering the propriety of the discharge,
arbitrators routinely examine the adequacy of the employer's investigation. See, e.g., Grief
Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 555, 558 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.) (listing as relevant
questions in discharge arbitrations, "Did the company . . . make an effort to discover
whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of management?"
and "Was the Company's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?"); FRANK ELKOURI
& EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 632-34 (3d ed. 1973) (discussing due process
and procedural requirements in discharge arbitrations).
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that the employee could call on her collective representative
during the investigatory process.
An employee's fate under City Disposal similarly is tied to the
union's relative strength. The employee's protection while as-
serting a collective-bargaining right depends entirely on the
protections and procedures that the union succeeded in obtaining
during negotiations.37 5 In justifying the Court's decision, Justice
Brennan reasoned that the employee's reliance on the contract
"reharness[ed] the power" of the bargaining unit.3 76 "The power
of the union in City Disposal enabled it to obtain the employer's
promise not to require employees to drive unsafe vehicles. 77 If
the employer wished to avoid the employees' right to enforce
the contract by refusing to perform an assigned task, a suffi-
ciently powerful employer could reject such a proposal during
negotiations: "[I]f an employer does not wish to tolerate certain
methods by which employees invoke their collectively bargained
rights, he is free to negotiate a provision in his collective-bar-
gaining agreement that limits the availability of such methods."37 8
Again, Justice Brennan placed no limits on what those substan-
tive terms might be; the protection extends only to the process
of enforcing the rights obtained by the union in collective bar-
gaining. The protection for the individual under Weingarten and
City Disposal thus is restricted by the economic power of the
union in a way that seems more in harmony with Justice Bren-
nan's view of the union-employer relationship.
Related themes link Justice Brennan's concern for economic
freedom and his opinions involving individuals in dispute with
their union representatives. In Weingarten and City Disposal,
Justice Brennan prevented the employer from driving a wedge
between an employee and the union. Much the same function is
served by decisions that limit the use of union dues and protect
member access to the internal union election process. In both
sets of cases, the employee has been isolated from his union
representative -whether by the employer or the union itself. The
individual protections help ensure that the interests of the union
remain aligned with the individual. Union officials charged with
championing the employees' rights, thus, must be selected fairly,
by democratic process, to choose those whose views are most
375. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984).
376. Id. at 832.
377. Id. at 834.
378. Id. at 837.
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representative of the majority. Similarly, the individual effec-
tively can oppose the use of union dues for any purposes beyond
the employee's immediate collective-bargaining concerns. As ex-
plicitly articulated by Brennan in his TWA dissent,3' 9 the goal of
solidarity-the very source of the union's strength -provides a
unifying link.
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan's early exposure to the struggles of the labor
movement, through his father's eyes, may have developed a
sympathetic appreciation for the goals of union organization and
the power of group action. Brennan's later assumption of the role
of legal advocate for employers, however, possibly tempered such
sympathies. The labels "pro-employee," "pro-union," or "pro-man-
agement" are far too simplistic to explain the results reflected
in thirty-three years worth of opinions. Employers no doubt
applauded opinions such as Buffalo Linen,380 Brown, 81 Boys Mar-
kets,382 and Belknap.38 Brennan's positions vindicated unions in
other areas, as demonstrated in Insurance Agents,-m TWA,38 5
Machinists,3 86 National Woodwork Manufacturers,m Tree Fruits,u
Katz,389 and Yeshiva University.39 Finally, the individual union
member employee could take comfort in opinions such as Street,3 9'
Wirtz,392 Weingarten393 and City Disposal.394
That often delicate equilibrium of industrial peace was achieved,
as crafted by Brennan, by permitting the parties a relatively
wide range of freedom in flexing their respective economic mus-
379. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
380. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
381. NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
382. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
383. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
384. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
385. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426 (1989).
386. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
387. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
388. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964).
389. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
390. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
391. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
392. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
393. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
394. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
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cles. Justice Brennan recognized that no single formula-or at-
tempt at constant supervision-could accomplish the voluntary
resolutions critical to successful union-employer relationships. He
envisioned the NLRA as a means to protect that process, within
certain boundaries necessary to assure the continuing solidarity
of the bargaining unit.395 Even the boundaries he erected, how-
ever, remained part of a coherent scheme.
395. Justice Brennan's concerns with the rights of public employees under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments parallel his emphasis on process under the NLRA. Over
the course of three decades, he struggled with the Court to expand due process protections
for these individuals.
In his first written opinion on the issue, Justice Brennan argued that even an employee
labeled a "security risk" in the Naval Gun Factory was entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The majority in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), rejected the due process challenge of a cafeteria
cook summarily dismissed from the Naval Gun Factory for unspecified "security" reasons.
Id. at 899. The Court relied heavily on the importance of security at such an installation
and the historical power of a commanding officer to exclude civilians from military
premises. Id. at 891-92. In dissent, Justice Brennan contended that the Fifth Amendment
entitled the employee to notice of the reasons for her discharge and a chance to defend
herself. Id. at 900-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Surely if the plaintiff were terminated for
her race or religion, he argued, "some constitutionally protected interest-whether
'liberty' or 'property' it [was] unnecessary to state-had been injured." Id. at 900. Again
in dissent, Brennan contended in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), that a property
interest was created when "it was objectively reasonable for the employee to believe he
could rely on continued employment." Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority
of the Court apparently was less concerned with the employee's expectations and upheld
the district court's construction of the state law making the plaintiff an employee at will.
Id. at 344-45 (majority opinion).
By 1984, a government employee's right to a termination notice and hearing was more
firmly established; nonetheless, qualified immunity remained an obstacle in actions against
state officials. For example, in Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984), a highway patrol
employee was terminated for his refusal to quit a part-time job as a security guard. The
Court held that a government official's qualified immunity could be overcome only if the
employee's constitutional rights were firmly established at the time of the alleged
violation. Id. at 194. When the incident in question occurred, the Court decided, the
employee's constitutional right to a hearing was not clear in existing precedent. Id. at
191-93. Justice Brennan acquiesced in the majority's standard for overcoming qualified
immunity but argued that the standard was misapplied in this case. Id. at 198 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The employer neither notified the employee
that his part-time job would result in termination nor permitted him a chance to respond.
Id. at 199-200. Both requirements, he contended, were "clearly established" constitutional
rights on the date of the plaintiffs discharge. Id. at 200-01.
Less than a year later, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985), the Court apparently settled the right of a public employee to pretermination
notice and hearing when state law created a property right in continued employment.
Id. at 542-48. Justice Brennan was uncomfortable, however, with the majority's failure
to explore the extent of pretermination procedures required. Id. at 552-53 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although Loudermill did not involve factual
disputes, Justice Brennan wrote separately to emphasize that other cases might demand
1176
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Justice Brennan objected to employer strong-arm tactics in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) v. Independent Federation of
more extensive procedures:
The Court acknowledges that what the Constitution requires prior to dis-
charge, in general terms, is pretermination procedures sufficient to provide
"an initial check against mistaken decisions-essentially, a determination of
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against
the employee are true and support the proposed action." When factual
disputes are involved, therefore, an employee may deserve a fair opportunity
before discharge to produce contrary records or testimony, or even to
confront an accuser in front of the decisionmaker. Such an opportunity might
not necessitate "elaborate" procedures, but the fact remains that in some
cases only such an opportunity to challenge the source or produce contrary
evidence will suffice to support a finding that there are "reasonable grounds"
to believe accusations are "true."
Id. at 552-53 (citations omitted) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 545-46). Justice Brennan
further expressed his concern that the nine-month delay for a final administrative decision
in Loudermill might constitute a separate constitutional violation. Id. at 554-58. Contrary
to the majority of the Court, he felt that additional factual development was needed. Id.
Similar to Justice Brennan's protection of the "market" forces under the NLRA,
procedural protections are a two-edged sword. One thinks of protecting the employee in
such circumstances, yet Justice Brennan was equally cognizant of the employer's due
process rights. In Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987), Brennan challenged
the Secretary of Labor's right to order preliminary reinstatement of a discharged
employee without providing the employer an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 269-71. The
employer in Brock allegedly discharged the employee for intentionally damaging his truck.
Id. at 255-56. The employee claimed he was fired in retaliation for complaining of safety
violations and, consequently, filed a charge with the Secretary of Labor under S 405 of
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. App. § 2305 (1988). Brock,
481 U.S. at 256. After a preliminary investigation, the Department ordered the employee
reinstated pending final resolution of the charge, as permitted by § 405. Id. at 256. Relying
heavily on Loudermill, Brennan argued in partial dissent that the employer possessed a
parallel due process right to protect her "property interest-the right to discharge an
employee for cause under the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 270 n.* (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Here Roadway contested the facts underlying the Secretary's preliminary
determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the discharge
of Hufstetler was retaliatory. When there are factual disputes that pertain
to the validity of a deprivation, due process "require[s] more than a simple
opportunity to argue or deny." Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 552 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Predeprivation procedures must provide "an initial check against
mistaken decisions-essentially, a determination of whether there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the charges ...are true and support the
proposed action." Id., at 545-546 (emphasis added). When, as here, the dis-
puted question central to the deprivation is factual, and when, as here, there
is no assurance that adequate final process will be prompt, predeprivation
procedures are unreliable if they do not give the employer "an opportunity
to test the strength of the evidence 'by confronting and cross-examining
adverse witnesses and by presenting witnesses on .[its] own behalf.'" Id. at
548 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Thus,
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Flight Attendants,396 for example, not because he believed the
employer had become too powerful but rather because the tactic
in question undermined the cohesiveness of the employee group
critical to the union-employer confrontation.397 Similarly, in as-
suring union members' access to democratic election procedures,
Brennan prevented the union from artificially controlling the
direction of the group by silencing the voices of dissent.39 8 The
union voice could only be unified, and hence effective, if developed
through full participation of the constituency represented.3 99 In
the same way, Justice Brennan's restrictions on the use of union
dues promoted solidarity by limiting peripheral conflict about
expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining.400 Other protec-
tions for the individual, such as the Weingarten4 1 right to union
representation during disciplinary investigations and the City
Disposal402 right to assert protections under a collective-bargain-
ing agreement, are equally consistent with Brennan's broader
philosophy by assuring-just as he argued in TWA4 03-that the
employers such as Roadway are entitled to a fair opportunity to confront
the accuser, to cross-examine witnesses, and to produce contrary records
and testimony.
Id. at 269-70.
Justice Brennan's concerns with the rights of public employees were not limited
exclusively to procedural issues. For example, his dissenting opinions in cases such as
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that an
employee in the District Attorney's office had a First Amendment right to oppose work
assignments and distribute a questionnaire to other employees concerning office policies);
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (stating that limiting access to mail facilities to faculty bargaining repre-
sentative violated First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause); and Minnesota State
Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 295 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that limiting access to "meet and confer" procedures to faculty bargaining
representative violated First Amendment), demonstrated his commitment to workers'
First Amendment rights. Nonetheless, his focus on the procedures by which public
employees were terminated, as opposed to the result of the decisionmaking process,
parallels the NLRA scheme that protects the process of collective bargaining while it
refuses the imposition of substantive contract terms. Declaring that his perspective of
the NLRA was grounded in his constitutional perspective, however, may be misleading.
Perhaps it was Justice Brennan's experience as a labor attorney, which required him to
focus on the process and procedures of labor relations, that grounded his constitutional
approach in the employment arena.
396. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
397. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 302-19 and accompanying text.
401. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
402. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
403. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,
489 U.S. 426, 426 (1989).
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individual could remain aligned with her collective-bargaining
representative. Once satisfied that the solidarity of the union
was adequately protected, however, he permitted the union to
succeed or fail regardless of the effect or fortuity of economic
forces.
Justice Brennan's vision of labor relationships as reflected in
his opinions, although perhaps not systematically adopted in each
of them, nonetheless comes through with a cohesiveness which
may not be apparent on first review. It was not the Court's job,
he thought, to supervise or resolve the employer-union-employee
conflict under the NLRA. Rather, his goal was to protect the
process. He recognized that industrial peace, just like any pro-
ductive relationship, could be achieved only by the parties them-
selves-not by the tight reins of an overprotective governmental
parent.

